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Abstract
In this article, we present a discrete time modeling framework, in which the shape and dynamics of a Limit
Order Book (LOB) arise endogenously from an equilibrium between multiple market participants (agents). We
use the proposed modeling framework to analyze the effects of trading frequency on market liquidity in a very
general setting. In particular, we demonstrate the dual effect of high trading frequency. On the one hand, the
higher frequency increases market efficiency, if the agents choose to provide liquidity in equilibrium. On the other
hand, it also makes markets more fragile, in the sense that the agents choose to provide liquidity in equilibrium
only if they are market-neutral (i.e., their beliefs satisfy certain martingale property). Even a very small deviation
from market-neutrality may cause the agents to stop providing liquidity, if the trading frequency is sufficiently
high, which represents an endogenous liquidity crisis (aka flash crash) in the market. This framework enables us
to provide more insight into how such a liquidity crisis unfolds, connecting it to the so-called adverse selection
effect.
Key words: liquidity, trading frequency, Limit Order Book, continuum-player games, conditional tails of Itoˆ processes.
1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with liquidity effects of trading frequency on an auction-style exchange, in which the
participating agents can post limit or market orders. On the one hand, higher trading frequency provides more
opportunities for the market participants to trade, hence, improving the liquidity of the market and increasing its
efficiency. On the other hand, higher trading frequency also provides more opportunities for some participants
to manipulate the price and disrupt the market liquidity. Such a manipulation creates a new type of risk, which
reveals itself in unusually high price deviations, which cannot be explained by changes in the fundamental value
of the asset. The most famous example of this phenomenon is the “flash crash” of 2010. This example motivates
the need for a comprehensive study of the tradeoff between the liquidity providing role of strategic players and the
liquidity risk they generate, and its relation to trading frequency. The collective liquidity of the market is captured
by the Limit Order Book (LOB), which contains all the limit buy and sell orders.
The goal of the present paper is two-fold. First, we develop a new framework for modeling market microstruc-
ture, in which the shape of the LOB, and its dynamics, arise endogenously from the interactions between the agents.
Among the many advantages of such an approach is the possibility of modeling the market reaction to changes in
the rules of the exchange: e.g., limited trading frequency, transaction tax, etc. The second, and most important,
goal of the present work is to investigate the liquidity effects of trading frequency, using the proposed modeling
framework. In particular, the main results of this paper (cf. the discussion in Section 3, as well as Theorems 4.1, 4.2
and Corollary 4.1, in Section 4) describe the dual effect of high trading frequency. On the one hand, if the agents
choose to provide liquidity in equilibrium, higher trading frequency decreases the bid-ask spread and makes the
expected profits of all market participants converge to the same (fundamental) value, thus, improving the market
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efficiency. On the other hand, higher trading frequency also makes the LOB more sensitive to the deviations of the
agents’ attitudes from market-neutrality. It is, of course, clear that a strong bullish or bearish signal induces market
participants to trade at a higher or lower price. However, the novelty of our observation is in the role that the trading
frequency plays in amplifying this effect. Namely, we show that, if the trading frequency is high, even if agents
have plenty of inventory, a very small deviation from market-neutrality may cause them to stop providing liquidity,
by either withdrawing from the market completely, or by posting limit orders far away from the fundamental price.
Such actions cause disproportional deviations in the LOB, which cannot be explained by any fundamental reasons:
they are much higher than the trading signal (i.e., the expected change in the fundamental price), and they occur
without any shortage of supply or demand for the asset. We refer to such a deviation as an endogenous liquidity
crisis, because it is due to the trading mechanism (i.e., the rules by which the market participants interact), rather
than any fundamental reasons (note the similarity with the flash crash). Our framework provides insights into
how such a liquidity crisis unfolds, connecting it to the so-called adverse selection effect. In particular, Section 3
constructs an equilibrium in which an endogenous liquidity crisis does not occur because of an abnormally large
market order, wiping out the liquidity on one side of the LOB, but because the optimal strategies of the agents
require them to stop providing liquidity on one side of the LOB. On the mathematical side, our analysis uses the
properties of conditional tails of the increments of a general Itoˆ process. The main result in that regard, in Lemma
5.2, provides a uniform exponential bound on the conditional tails of the increments of a general Itoˆ process. We
believe that this result is useful in its own right, and, to the best of our knowledge, it is not available in the existing
literature.
In recent years, we observed an explosion in the amount of literature devoted to the study of market microstruc-
ture. In addition to various empirical studies, a large part of the existing theoretical work focuses on the problem of
optimal execution: see, among others, Obizhaeva & Wang (2013), Almgren (2003), Schied et al. (2010), Gatheral
& Schied (2011), Cont et al. (2010), Bayraktar & Ludkovski (2011), Avellaneda & Stoikov (2008), Cvitanic´ &
Kirilenko (2010), Predoiu et al. (2011), Gue´ant & Lehalle (2015), Cartea & Jaimungal (2013), Guilbaud & Pham
(2013), Stoikov & Waeber (2012), and references therein. In these articles, the dynamics and shape of the LOB
are modeled exogenously, or, equivalently, the arrival processes of the limit and market orders are specified exoge-
nously. In particular, none of these articles attempts to explain the shape and dynamics of the LOB, arising directly
from the interaction between the market participants. A different approach to the analysis of market microstructure
has its roots in the economic literature. For example, Parlour (1998), Foucault (1999), Goettler et al. (2005),
Carmona & Webster (n.d.), Lachapelle et al. (2013), Rosu (2009), Du & Zhu (2014), Bressan & Facchi (2013),
Bressan & Facchi (2014), Bressan & Wei (2016) consider equilibrium models of market microstructure, and they
are more closely related to the present work. However, the models proposed in the aforementioned papers do not
aim to represent the mechanics of an auction-style exchange with sufficient precision, and, in particular, they are
not well suited for analyzing the liquidity effects of trading frequency, which is the main focus of the present paper.
A somewhat related strand of literature focuses on the endogenous formation of LOB in markets with a designated
market maker: see e.g., Glosten & Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), Easley & O’Hara (1992), Carmona & Webster
(2012), Adrian et al. (2016). In these papers, the LOB is not an outcome of a multi-agent equilibrium: instead, it
is controlled by a single agent, the market maker. In the present paper, we model the entire LOB as an output of
an equilibrium between a large number of agents, each of whom is allowed to both consume and provide liquidity
(in particular, we have no designated market maker). Our setting is related to the literature on double auctions
(cf. Vayanos (1999), Du & Zhu (2014)), with the crucial difference that the participants of each auction are al-
lowed to choose two “asymmetric” types of strategies: market or limit orders. In addition, the present framework
assumes that, ex ante, all agents have access to the same information, and, in this sense, it is similar to Parlour
(1998), Goettler et al. (2005), Rosu (2009). In particular, the adverse selection effect, herein, does not arise from
any a priori information asymmetry between agents, instead, it is caused by the mechanics of the exchange. We
formulate the problem as a continuum-player game – this abstraction allows us to obtain computationally tractable
results (cf. Aumann (1964), Schmeidler (1973), Carmona (2013) for the concept of a continuum-player game, and
Lasry & Lions (2007), Cardaliaguet (2010), Carmona & Delarue (2013), Lacker (2014) for the subclass of mean
field games).
The paper is organized as follows. Subsection 2.1 describes the probabilistic setting, along with the execution
rules of the exchange and the resulting state processes of the agents. Subsection 2.2 defines the equilibrium and
introduces the notion of degeneracy of the market (which represents an endogenous liquidity crisis). In Section 3,
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we construct an equilibrium in a simple model, illustrating how an endogenous liquidity crisis unfolds, and how it
is connected to the adverse selection effect. Theorems 4.1, 4.2, and Corollary 4.1, in Section 4, are the main results
of the paper: they formalize and generalize the conclusions of Section 3. In Section 5, we prove the key technical
results on the (conditional) tails of marginal distributions of Itoˆ processes. Sections 6, 7 contain the proofs of the
main results. We conclude in Section 8.
2 Modeling framework for a finite-frequency auction-style exchange
2.1 Mechanics of the exchange
We consider an exchange in which trading can only occur at discrete times n = 0, 1, . . . , N . We assume that the
market participants are split into two groups: the external investors, who are “impatient”, in the sense that they only
submit market orders, and the strategic players, who can submit both market and limit orders, and who are willing
to optimize their actions over a given (short) time horizon, in order to get a better execution price.1 In our study, we
focus on the strategic players, who are referred to as agents, and we model the behavior of the external investors
exogenously, via an exogenous demand. The interpretation of the external investors is clear: these are the investors
who either have a longer-term view on the market, or who simply need to buy or sell the asset for reasons other
than short-term profits. The strategic players (i.e., agents), on the contrary, are short-term traders, who attempt to
maximize their objective at a shorter time horizon N . During every time period [n, n+ 1), all the orders coming to
the exchange are split into limit and market orders. The limit orders are collected in the so-called Limit Order Book
(LOB), and the market orders form the demand curve. At time n + 1, the market orders in the demand curve are
executed against the limit orders in the LOB. Then, this process is repeated in the next time interval. In particular,
during a time period [n, n + 1) (for simplicity, we say “at time n”), an agent is allowed to submit a market order,
post a limit buy or sell order, or wait (i.e., do nothing). If a limit order is not executed in a given time period,
it costs nothing to cancel or re-position it for the next time period. Notice that our framework does not model
the time-priority of limit orders. However, introducing a time-priority would not change the agents’ maximum
objective value, as the “tick size” is assumed to be zero (i.e., the set of possible price levels is R), and, hence, an
agent can always achieve a priority by posting her order “infinitesimally” above or below a given competing order.
Further details on modeling the formation of an LOB and the execution rules are presented below.
The demand curves are modeled exogenously by a random field D = (Dn(p))p∈R,n=1,...,N on a filtered
probability space
(
Ω,F = (Fn)Nn=0 ,P
)
, such that F0 is a trivial sigma-algebra, completed w.r.t. P. The random
variable D+n (p) = max(Dn(p), 0) denotes the number of shares of the asset that the external investors and the
agents submitting market orders are willing to purchase at or below the price p, accumulated over the time period
[n−1, n), andD−n (p) = −min(Dn(p), 0) denotes the number of shares of the asset that the external investors and
the agents submitting market orders are willing to sell at or above the price p, in the same time period. We assume
that Dn(·) is a.s. nonincreasing and measurable w.r.t. Fn ⊗ B(R). We denote by A a Borel space of beliefs, and,
for each α ∈ A, there exists a subjective probability measure Pα on (Ω,FN ), which is absolutely continuous with
resect to P. We assume that, for any n = 0, . . . , N and any α ∈ A, there exists a regular version of the conditional
probability Pα given Fn, denoted Pαn .2 We denote the associated conditional expectations by Eαn . We also need to
assume that, for any α ∈ A, there exists a modification of the family {Pαn}Nn=0, which satisfies the tower property
with respect to P, in the following sense: for any n ≤ m and any r.v. ξ, such that Eαξ+ <∞, we have
EαnEαmξ = Eαnξ, P-a.s.
There exists such a modification, for example, if Pα ∼ P. In any market model, for every α, we fix such a mod-
ification of conditional probabilities (up to a set of P-measure zero) and assume that all conditional expectations
{Eαn} are taken under this family of measures. The Limit Order Book (LOB) is given by a pair of adapted processes
ν = (ν+n , ν
−
n )
N
n=0, such that every ν
+
n and ν
−
n is a finite sigma-additive random measure on R (w.r.t. Fn ⊗B(R)).
1We do not distinguish the “aggressive” limit orders, which are posted at the price level of an opposite limit order, and treat them as market
orders. This causes no loss of generality, as the market participants in our setting have a perfect observation of the LOB.
2This assumption holds, for example, if FN is generated by a random element with values in a standard Borel space.
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Herein, ν+n corresponds to the cumulative limit sell orders, and ν
−
n corresponds to the cumulative limit buy orders,
posted at time n.The bid and ask prices at any time n = 0, . . . , N are given by the random variables
pbn = sup supp(ν
−
n ), p
a
n = inf supp(ν
+
n ),
respectively. Notice that these extended random variables are always well defined but may take infinite values.
We define the state space of an agent as S = R × A, where the first component denotes the inventory of an
agent, and the second component denotes her beliefs. Every agent in state (s, α) models the future outcomes using
the subjective probability measure Pα. There are infinitely many agents, and their distribution over the state space
is given by the empirical distribution process µ = (µn)Nn=0, such that every µ is a finite sigma-additive random
measure on S (w.r.t. Fn ⊗ B(S)). In particular, the total mass of agents in the set S ⊂ S at time n is given by
µn(S). The inventory level s represents the number of shares per agent, held in state (s, α). In particular, the
total number of shares held by all agents in the set S ⊂ S is given by ∫
S
sµn(ds, dα). The interpretation of this
definition in a finite-player game is discussed in Remark 2.1 below. We refer the reader to Carmona (2013) for the
general concept of a continuum-player game.
Remark 2.1. The continuum-player game defined in this section can be related to a finite-player game as follows.
Denote by µ0 the empirical distribution of the agents’ states at a given time. Recall that µ0 is a measure on
S = R × A, and assume that it is a finite linear combination of Dirac measures: µ0 = 1M
∑M
i=1 δ(si,αi). In
this case, we interpret si as the number of shares per agent held by the agents in the ith group. Let us explain
how this notion is related to the actual inventory levels (i.e., the actual numbers of shares held by the agents) in
the associated finite-player game. To this end, consider a collection of M agents, whose states are given by their
(actual) inventories and beliefs, (s, α), with the current states being {(s˜i = si/M,αi)}. Define the “unit mass”
of agents to be M . In this finite-player collection, the mass of agents (measured relative to the unit mass, M ) at
any state (Ms,α) is precisely µ0({(s, α)}), and their total inventory is Msµ0({(s, α)}). The number of shares
per agent is, then, defined as the total inventory held by these agents divided by their mass, and it is equal to Ms.
Choosing s = s˜i, we conclude that, in the finite-player collection, the number of shares per agent held by the
agents at state (s˜i, αi) is given byMs˜i = si, which coincides with our interpretation of si in the continuum-player
game. It is also easy to show that an equilibrium in the proposed continuum-player game (defined in the next
subsection) produces an approximate equilibrium in the associated finite-player game, when the inventory levels
{s˜i} are small (cf. Subsection 2.3 in the extended version of this paper, Gayduk & Nadtochiy (2015))
As the parameter α does not change over time, the state process of an agent, denoted (Sn), is an adapted R-
valued process, representing her inventory.3 The control of every agent is given by a triplet of adapted processes
(p, q, r) = (pn, qn, rn)
N−1
n=0 on (Ω,F), with values in R2 × {0, 1}. The first coordinate, pn, indicates the location
of a limit order placed at time n, and qn indicates the size of the order (measured in shares per agent, and with
negative values corresponding to buy orders).4 The last coordinate rn shows whether the agent submits a market
order (if rn = 1) or a limit order (if rn = 0). Assume that an agent posts a limit sell order at a price level pn. If the
demand to buy the asset at this price level, D+n+1(pn), exceeds the amount of all limit sell orders posted below pn
at time n, then (and only then) the limit sell order of the agent is executed. Market orders of the agents are always
executed at the bid or ask prices available at the time when the order is submitted. We interpret an internal market
order (i.e., the one submitted by an agent) as the decision of an agent to join the external investors, in the given
time period. Summing up the above, we obtain the following dynamics for the state process of an agent, starting
with initial inventory s ∈ R at time m = 0, . . . , N − 1:
S(p,q,r)m (m, s, ν) = s, ∆S
(p,q,r)
n+1 (m, s, ν) = S
(p,q,r)
n+1 (m, s, ν)− S(p,q,r)n (m, s, ν) = −qn1{rn=1}
(2.1) − 1{rn=0}
(
q+n 1{D+n+1(pn)>ν+n ((−∞,pn))} − q
−
n 1{D−n+1(pn)>ν−n ((pn,∞))}
)
, n = m, . . . , N − 1.
3Note that, although Pα does not change over time, the conditional distribution of the future demand, as perceived by the agent, changes
dynamically, according to the new information received.
4Note each agent is only allowed to place her limit order at a single price level, at any given time. However, this entails no loss of optimality.
Indeed, using the Dynamic Programming Principle derived in Appendix A, one can show, by induction, that, in equilibrium, an agent does not
benefit from posting multiple limit orders at the same time. As shown in Schmeidler (1973), this is typical for a continuum-player game.
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The above dynamics represent an optimistic view on the execution by the agents. In particular, they imply that all
limit orders at the same price level are executed in full, once the demand reaches them: i.e., each agent believes that
her limit order will be executed first among all orders at a given price level. In addition, all agents’ market orders
are executed at the bid and ask prices: i.e., each agent believes that her market order will be executed first, when
the demand curve is cleared against the LOB, at the end of a given time period. These assumptions can be partially
justified by the fact that the agents’ orders are infinitesimal: qn is measured in shares per agent, and an individual
agent has zero mass. However, if a non-zero mass of agents submit limit orders at the same price level, or execute
market orders, at the same time, then, the above state dynamics may violate the market clearing condition: the
total size of executed market orders (both in shares and in dollars) may not coincide with the total size of executed
limit orders (at least, as viewed by the agents). Nevertheless, this issue is resolved if, at any time, the mass of
agents posting limit orders at the same price level or posting market orders is zero. In other words, (ν, p, q, r)
satisfy, P-a.s.: νn is continuous, as a measure on R (i.e., it has no atoms), and rn = 0. Such an equilibrium is
constructed in Section 8 of the extended version of this paper, Gayduk & Nadtochiy (2015). The general definition
of a continuum-player game and its connection to a finite-player game can be found, e.g., in Carmona (2013) and in
the references therein (see also Subsection 2.3 in the extended version of this paper, Gayduk & Nadtochiy (2015)).
The modeling framework proposed herein has a close connection to the models of double auctions, in the
economic literature (cf. Du & Zhu (2014), Vayanos (1999)). The main difference is in the non-standard design of
the auction. Namely, in the proposed setting, the auction participants may choose different styles of trading, i.e.,
market or limit orders, which generates an ex-post information asymmetry between participants: the limit orders
have to be submitted before the demand curve is observed, while the market orders are submitted using complete
information about the LOB. This difference is not coincidental – it is, in fact, crucial for a realistic representation
of the risks associated with each order type, and it is at the core of the results established herein. A more detailed
discussion of the information structure is provided in the next subsection.
2.2 Equilibrium
The objective function of an agent, starting at the initial state (s, α) ∈ S, at any time m = 0, . . . , N , and using the
control (p, q, r), is given by the Fm-measurable random variable
(2.2) J (p,q,r)(m, s, α, ν) = Eαm
[(
S
(p,q,r)
N (m, s, ν)
)+
pbN −
(
S
(p,q,r)
N (m, s, ν)
)−
paN
−
N−1∑
n=m
(
pn1{rn=0} + p
a
n1{rn=1,qn<0} + p
b
n1{rn=1,qn>0}
)
∆S
(p,q,r)
n+1 (m, s, ν)
]
,
where we assume that 0 · ∞ = 0. In the above expression, we assume that, at the final time n = N , each agent is
forced to liquidate her position at the bid or ask prices available at that time. Alternatively, one can think of it as
marking to market the residual inventory, right after the last external market order is executed.
Definition 2.1. For a given LOB ν, integerm = 0, . . . , N−1, and state (s, α) ∈ S, the triplet of adapted processes
(p, q, r) is an admissible control if the positive part of the expression inside the expectation in (2.2) has a finite
expectation under Pα.
For a given LOB ν, an initial condition (m, s, α), and a triplet of F×B(S)-adapted random fields (p, q, r), we
identify the latter (whenever it causes no confusion) with stochastic processes (p, q, r) via:
pn = pn
(
S(p,q,r)n (m, s, ν), α
)
, qn = qn
(
S(p,q,r)n (m, s, ν), α
)
, rn = rn
(
S(p,q,r)n (m, s, ν), α
)
,
and the state dynamics (2.1), for n = m, . . . , N . This system determines (p, q, r) and S(p,q,r) recursively.
Definition 2.2. For a given LOB ν, we call the triplet of progressively measurable random fields (p, q, r) an
optimal control if, for any m = 0, . . . , N and any (s, α) ∈ S, we have:
• (p, q, r) is admissible,
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• J (p,q,r)(m, s, α, ν) ≥ J (p′,q′,r′)(m, s, α, ν), P-a.s., for any admissible control (p′, q′, r′).
In the above, we make the standard simplifying assumptions of continuum-player games: each agent is too
small to affect the empirical distribution of cumulative controls (reflected in ν) when she changes her control (cf.
Carmona (2013)). Note also that our definition of the optimal control implies that it is time consistent: re-evaluation
of the optimality at any future step, using the same terminal criteria, must lead to the same optimal strategy. Next,
we discuss the notion of equilibrium in the proposed game. First, we notice that, if pbN or p
a
N becomes infinite, the
agents with positive or negative inventory may face the objective value of “−∞”, for any control they use. In such
a case, their optimal controls may be chosen in an arbitrary way, resulting in unrealistic equilibria. To avoid this,
we impose the additional regularity condition on ν.
Definition 2.3. A given LOB ν is admissible if, for any m = 0, . . . , N − 1 and any α ∈ A, we have, P-a.s.:
Eαm|paN | ∨ |pbN | <∞.
Let us consider the (stochastic) value function of an agent for a fixed (m, s, α, ν):
(2.3) V νm(s, α) = esssupp,q,rJ
(p,q,r) (m, s, α, ν) ,
where the essential supremum is taken under P, over all admissible controls (p, q, r), and J (p,q,r) is given by (2.2).
Appendix A shows that, for any admissible ν, V νm(·, α) has a continuous modification under P, which we refer to
as the value function of an agent with beliefs α. Using the Dynamic Programming Principle, Appendix A provides
an explicit system of recursive equations that characterize optimal strategies and the value function. In particular,
the results of Appendix A (cf. Corollary 9.1) yield the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. Assume that, for an admissible LOB ν, there exists an optimal control (pˆ, qˆ, rˆ). Then, for any
(s, α) ∈ S, the following holds P-a.s., for all n = 0, . . . , N − 1:
V νn (s, α) = s
+λan(α)− s−λbn(α),
with some adapted processes λa(α) and λb(α), such that λaN (α) = p
b
N and λ
b
N (α) = p
a
N .
The values of λa(α) and λb(α) can be interpreted as the expected execution prices of the agents with beliefs
α, who are long and short the asset, respectively.
Definition 2.4. Consider an empirical distribution process µ = (µn)Nn=0 and a market model, as described in
Subsection 2.1. We say that a given LOB process ν and a control (p, q, r) form an equilibrium, if there exists a
Borel set A˜ ⊂ A, called the support of the equilibrium, such that:
1. µn
(
R×
(
A \ A˜
))
= 0, P-a.s., for all n,
2. ν is admissible, and (p, q, r) is an optimal control for ν, on the state space S˜ = R× A˜,
3. and, for any n = 0, . . . , N − 1, we have, P-a.s.,
(2.4) ν+n ((−∞, x]) =
∫
S˜
1{pn(s,α)≤x,rn(s,α)=0} q
+
n (s, α)µn(ds, dα), ∀x ∈ R,
(2.5) ν−n ((−∞, x]) =
∫
S˜
1{pn(s,α)≤x,rn(s,α)=0} q
−
n (s, α)µn(ds, dα), ∀x ∈ R.
Remark 2.2. It follows from Proposition 2.1 that, in equilibrium, it is optimal for an agent with zero initial inven-
tory to do nothing. Hence, in equilibrium, roundtrip strategies are impossible. To allow for roundtrip strategies
in equilibrium, one can, e.g., introduce an upper bound on |q| or on the total inventory of an agent (as it is done,
e.g., in Brunnermeier & Pedersen (2005)). However, we do not believe that such a modification would change the
qualitative behavior of market liquidity as a function of trading frequency, which is the main focus of the present
paper.
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Notice that, because the optimal controls are required to be time consistent under P, the above definition, in
fact, defines a sub-game perfect equilibrium. It is also worth mentioning that Definition 2.4 defines a partial
equilibrium, as the empirical distribution process µ is given exogenously. A more traditional version of Nash
equilibrium would require µ to be determined by the initial distribution and the values of the state processes:
(2.6) µn = µ0 ◦
(
(s, α) 7→
(
S(p,q,r)n (0, s, ν), α
))−1
,
which must hold P-a.s., for all n = 0, . . . , N , with S(p,q,r)n (0, s, ν) defined via (2.1), in addition to the other
conditions in Definition 2.4. Nevertheless, we choose not to enforce the condition (2.6) in the definition of equi-
librium, in order to allow new agents to enter the game, which, in effect, amounts to modeling µ exogenously.
If one assumes that no new agent arrives to the market, then, the fixed-point condition (2.6) has to be enforced.
Note also that our interpretation of the demand curve Dn(·) implies that it consists of both the external (i.e., due
external investors) and internal (i.e., due to the agents) market orders. Therefore, it may be reasonable to consider
an additional consistency condition for an equilibrium. A part of this condition is to ensure that a non-zero mass of
agents submit market buy orders only if the fundamental price rises above the ask price (i.e., only if a market buy
order is actually executed), and, similarly, a non-zero mass of agents submit market sell orders only if the funda-
mental price falls below the bid price. We assume that the agents’ market orders enter into the demand curve with
the highest level of priority: e.g., their market buy orders enter the demand curve at the price level infinitesimally
close to, but below, the fundamental price, in order to guarantee that they are the first ones to be executed. Thus,
another part of the aforementioned consistency condition is to ensure that the absolute value of the demand curve
to the left or to the right of the fundamental price is sufficiently large to account for all internal market orders.
Mathematically, such consistency condition can be formulated as follows:
(2.7) dbn := µn ({(s, α) : qn(s, α) < 0, rn(s, α) = 1}) > 0 ⇒ p0n+1 > pan, lim
p↑p0n+1
D+n+1(p) ≥ dbn,
(2.8) dan := µn ({(s, α) : qn(s, α) > 0, rn(s, α) = 1}) > 0 ⇒ p0n+1 < pbn, lim
p↓p0n+1
D−n+1(p) ≥ dan.
The above conditions become redundant if the agents never submit market orders in equilibrium. Section 8 of
the extended version of this paper, Gayduk & Nadtochiy (2015), shows how to construct an equilibrium which
satisfies condition (2.6), and in which the agents never submit market orders (hence, (2.7) and (2.8) are also
satisfied). However, it is important to emphasize that the main results of the present work (cf. Section 4) provide
necessary conditions for all equilibria: for those satisfying the conditions (2.6), (2.7), (2.8) and for the ones that
do not.
Remark 2.3. Let us comment on the information structure of the game. In the present setting, all agents observe
the same information, given by the filtration F. We consider an open-loop Nash equilibrium, in which the agent’s
strategy is viewed as an adapted stochastic process (rather than a function of the states and controls of other
players), and the definition of optimality is chosen accordingly. In addition, as µ is adapted to F, each agent has
complete information about the present and past states of other agents, and their beliefs. However, as the agents
use different (subjective) measures {Pα}, their views on the future values of µ may be different. Of course, it would
be more realistic to assume that the agents do not have complete information about each other’s current states, but
this would make the problem significantly more complicated. In the present setting, the agents also have complete
information about the current location of the fundamental price. In our follow-up paper, Gayduk & Nadtochiy
(2016), we relax this assumption, which allows us to develop a more realistic model for the “local” behavior of an
individual agent. However, such a relaxation does not seem necessary for the questions analyzed herein.
As all agents use the same information, the present article belongs to the strand of literature that attempts
to explain microstructure phenomena without information asymmetry (cf. Goettler et al. (2005), Rosu (2009),
Parlour (1998), Foucault (1999)). Nevertheless, it is important to mention that information asymmetry arises ex-
post, between the market participants submitting market and limit orders. This asymmetry is not due to superior
information a priori available to any of the agents. Instead, it stems from the very nature of limit orders, which are
“passive” by design (cf. the discussion on the last paragraph of Subsection 2.1). Similar observation is made in
Goettler et al. (2005).
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Next, we need to add another condition to the notion of equilibrium. Notice that equations (2.4)–(2.5) should
serve as the fixed-point constraints that enable one to obtain the optimal controls (p, q, r), along with the LOB ν.
However, these equations only hold for n = 0, . . . , N − 1: indeed, the agents do not need to choose their controls
at time n = N , as the game is over and their residual inventory is marked to the bid and ask prices. However, the
terminal bid and ask prices are determined by the LOB νN , which, in turn, can be chosen arbitrarily. To avoid such
ambiguity, we impose an additional constraint on the equilibria studied herein. First, we introduce the notion of a
fundamental price.
Definition 2.5. Assume that P-a.s., for any n = 1, . . . , N , there exists a unique p0n satisfying Dn
(
p0n
)
= 0. Then,
the adapted process (p0n)
N
n=1 is called the fundamental price process.
Whenever the notion of a fundamental price is invoked, we assume that it is well defined. The intuition behind
p0 is clear: it is a price level at which the immediate demand is balanced. However, it is important to stress that
we do not assume that the asset can be traded at the fundamental price level. Rather, p0 is a feature of the abstract
current demand curve, whereas all actual trading happens on the exchange, against the current LOB. This aspect
of our setting differs from many other approaches in the literature.
Definition 2.6. Assume that the fundamental price is well defined and denote ξN = p0N − p0N−1. Then, an
equilibrium with LOB ν is linear at terminal crossing (LTC) if
(2.9) νN = νN−1 ◦ (x 7→ x+ ξN )−1, P-a.s.
The above definition assumes that the terminal LOB νN is obtained from νN−1 by a simple shift, with the
size of the shift equal to the increment in the fundamental price. This definition connects the LOB at the terminal
time with the demand process, ruling out many unnatural equilibria. In particular, the question of existence of an
equilibrium becomes non-trivial. However, the mere existence of an equilibrium is not the main focus of the present
work: the existence results, established herein, are limited to Section 3, which constructs an LTC equilibrium in a
specific Gaussian random walk model (a slightly more general existence result is given in Section 8 of the extended
version of this paper, Gayduk & Nadtochiy (2015)). What is central to the present investigation is the observation
that the agents may reach an equilibrium in which one side of the LOB becomes empty (as demonstrated by the
example of Section 3). We call such LOB, and the associated equilibrium, degenerate.
Definition 2.7. We say that an equilibrium with LOB ν is non-degenerate if ν+n (R) > 0 and ν−n (R) > 0, for all
n = 0, . . . , N − 1, P-a.s..
Intuitively, the degeneracy of the LOB refers to a situation where, with positive probability, one side of the
LOB disappears from the market: i.e., ν+n (R) or ν−n (R) becomes zero. Clearly, this happens when the agents who
are supposed to provide liquidity choose to post market orders (i.e. consume liquidity) or wait (neither provide nor
consume liquidity). Such a degeneracy can be interpreted as the endogenous liquidity crisis – the one that arises
purely from the interaction between the agents, and cannot be justified by any fundamental economic reasons (e.g.,
the external demand for the asset may still be high, on both sides). Taking an optimistic point of view, we assume
that the agents choose a non-degenerate equilibrium, whenever one is available. However, if a non-degenerate
equilibrium does not exist, an endogenous liquidity crisis may occur with positive probability. One of the main
goals of this paper is to provide insights into the occurrence of an endogenous liquidity crisis and its relation to
trading frequency.
3 Example: a Gaussian random walk model
In this section, we consider a specific market model for the external demand D, to construct a non-degenerate
LTC equilibrium. More importantly, using this model, we illustrate the liquidity effects of trading frequency. The
present example, albeit very simplistic, enables us to identify the important changes in the optimal strategies of the
agents (and, hence, to the LOB) as the trading frequency increases. In particular, we demonstrate how the adverse
selection effect may be amplified disproportionally by the high trading frequency and may cause a liquidity crisis.
Note that the adverse selection phenomenon, in the present setting, is not a consequence of any ex-ante information
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asymmetry but is due to the mechanics of the exchange (i.e., the nature of limit orders), which is similar to the
phenomena documented in Goettler et al. (2005), Foucault (1999). In the rest of the paper, we show that the
conclusions of this section are not due to the particular choice of a model made in the present section and, in fact,
persist in a much more general setting.
On a complete stochastic basis (Ω, F˜ = (F˜t)t∈[0,T ],P), we consider a continuous time process p˜0:
(3.1) p˜0t = p
0
0 + αt+ σWt, p
0
0 ∈ R, t ∈ [0, T ],
where α ∈ R and σ > 0 are constants, and W is a Brownian motion. We also consider an arbitrary progressively
measurable random field (D˜t(p)), s.t., P-a.s., the function D˜t(·) − D˜s(·) is strictly decreasing and vanishing at
zero, for any 0 ≤ s < t ≤ T . Finally, we introduce the empirical distribution process (µ˜t), with values in the space
of finite sigma-additive measures on S. We partition the time interval [0, T ] intoN subintervals of size ∆t = T/N .
A discrete time model is obtained by discretizing the continuous time one5
Fn = F˜n∆t, p0n = p˜0n∆t, Dn(p) = (D˜n∆t − D˜(n−1)∆t)(p− p0n), µn = µ˜n∆t.
In this section, for simplicity, we assume that the set of agents’ beliefs is a singleton: A = {α} and Pα = P. We
also assume that (at least, from the agents’ point of view) there are always some long and short agents present in the
market: µn ((0,∞)× A) , µn ((−∞, 0)× A) > 0, P-a.s., for all n. Clearly, N represents the trading frequency,
and the continuous time model represents the “limiting model,” which the agents use as a benchmark, in order
to make consistent predictions in the markets with different trading frequencies. We assume that the benchmark
model is fixed, and N is allowed to vary. In the remainder of this section, we propose a method for constructing
a non-degenerate LTC equilibrium in the above discrete time model. We show that the method succeeds for any
(N, σ) if α = 0. However, for α 6= 0, we demonstrate numerically that the method fails as N becomes large
enough. We show why, precisely, the proposed construction fails, providing an economic interpretation of this
phenomenon. Moreover, we analyze the market close to the moment when a non-degenerate equilibrium fails to
exist and demonstrate that the agents’ behavior at this time follows the pattern typical for an endogenous liquidity
crisis.
In view of Proposition 2.1, in order to construct a non-degenerate LTC equilibrium, we need to find a control
(pˆ, qˆ, rˆ), and the expected execution prices (λˆa, λˆb), s.t. the value function of an agent with inventory s is given by
Vn(s) = s
+λˆan − s−λˆbn, and it is attained by the strategy (pˆ, qˆ, rˆ). In addition, we need to find a non-degenerate
LOB ν, s.t. (2.4), (2.5) and (2.9) hold. Our ansatz is as follows
νn =
(
hanδpan , h
b
nδpbn
)
, pan = pˆ
a
n + p
0
n, p
b
n = pˆ
b
n + p
0
n, −∞ < pˆbn, pˆan <∞,
pˆn(s) = p
a
n1{s>0} + p
b
n1{s<0}, qˆn(s) = s, rˆn(s) = 0, λ
a
n = λˆ
a
n + p
0
n, λ
b
n = λˆ
b
n + p
0
n,
where δ is the Dirac measure, (pˆa, pˆb, λˆa, λˆb) are deterministic processes, and han =
∫∞
0
sµn(ds) > 0, hbn =∫ 0
−∞ |s|µn(ds) > 0. With such an ansatz, the conditions (2.4), (2.5) are satisfied automatically. Thus, we only
need to choose finite deterministic processes (pˆa, pˆb, λˆa, λˆb) s.t.: pˆaN = pˆ
a
N−1, pˆ
b
N = pˆ
b
N−1 (so that the equilibrium
is LTC) and the associated (pˆ, qˆ, 0) form an optimal control, producing the value function Vn(s) = s+λan −
s−λbn. Appendix A contains necessary and sufficient conditions for characterizing such families (p
a, pb, λa, λb).
In particular, we deduce from Corollaries 9.1 and 9.2 that (pˆaN−1, pˆ
b
N−1, λˆ
a
N−1, λˆ
b
N−1) form a suitable family in a
single-period case, [N − 1, N ], if they solve the following system:
(3.2)

pˆaN−1 ∈ arg maxp∈R E
(
(p− pˆbN−1 − ξ)1{ξ>p}
)
, pˆbN−1 < 0,
pˆbN−1 ∈ arg maxp∈R E
(
(pˆaN−1 − p+ ξ)1{ξ<p}
)
, pˆaN−1 > 0,
λˆaN−1 = pˆ
b
N−1 + α∆t+ E
(
(pˆaN−1 − pˆbN−1 − ξ)1{ξ>pˆaN−1}
)
,
λˆbN−1 = pˆ
a
N−1 + α∆t− E
(
(pˆaN−1 − pˆbN−1 + ξ)1{ξ<pˆbN−1}
)
,
pˆbN−1 ≤ λˆaN−1, λˆbN−1 ≤ pˆaN−1, pˆaN−1 ≥ pˆbN−1 + |α|∆t,
5In order to ensure the existence of regular conditional probabilities for the discrete time model, we can, for example, assume that F˜T is
generated by a random element with values in a standard Borel space.
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where ξ = ∆p0N ∼ N (α∆t, σ2∆t). Let us comment on the economic meaning of the equations in (3.2). The
expectations in the first two lines represent the relative expected profit from executing a limit order at time N , at
the chosen price level p + p0N−1, versus marking the inventory to market at time N , at the best price available
on the other side of the book: i.e., pbN = pˆ
b
N−1 + ξ + p
0
N−1 or p
a
N = pˆ
a
N−1 + ξ + p
0
N−1. Notice that a limit
order is executed if and only if the fundamental price at time N is above or below the chosen limit order: i.e., if
p0N−1 + ξ > p + p
0
N−1 or p
0
N−1 + ξ < p + p
0
N−1.
6 Clearly, it is only optimal for an agent to post a limit order
if the relative expected profit is nonnegative, which is the case if and only if pˆbN−1 < 0 < pˆ
a
N−1. The third and
fourth lines in (3.2) represent the expected execution prices of the agents at time N − 1, assuming they use the
controls given by (pˆaN−1, pˆ
b
N−1). Each of the right hand sides is a sum of two components: the relative expected
profit from posting a limit order and the expected value of marking to market at time N , measured relative to
p0N−1. Let us analyze the inequalities in the last line of (3.2). If the bid price at time N − 1 exceeds the expected
execution price of a long agent, i.e., pˆbN−1 + p
0
N−1 > λˆ
a
N−1 + p
0
N−1, then every agent with positive inventory
prefers to submit a market order, rather than a limit order, at time N − 1, which causes the ask side of the LOB to
degenerate. Similarly, we establish λˆbN−1 ≤ pˆaN−1. Finally, if α > 0 and pˆaN−1 < pˆbN−1 + α∆t, an agent may
buy the asset using a market order at time N − 1, at the price pˆaN−1 + p0N−1, and sell it at time N , at the expected
price pˆbN−1 + p
0
N−1 + α∆t > pˆ
a
N−1 + p
0
N−1 (a reverse strategy works for α < 0). This strategy can be scaled to
generate infinite expected profit and, hence, is excluded by the last inequality in the last line of (3.2).
We construct a solution to (3.2) by solving a fixed-point problem given by the first two lines of (3.2) and
verifying that the desired inequalities hold.7 We implement this computation in MatLab, and the results can be
seen as the right-most points on the graphs in Figure 1. From the numerical solution, we see that, whenever ∆t is
small enough, the conditions pˆbN−1 ≤ λˆaN−1 and λˆbN−1 ≤ pˆaN−1 are satisfied (cf. the right part of Figure 1).8 In
addition, for α ≥ 0, we have
0 < E
(
pˆaN−1 − pˆbN−1 − ξ | ξ > pˆaN−1
)
= pˆaN−1 − pˆbN−1 − E
(
ξ | ξ > pˆaN−1
) ≤ pˆaN−1 − pˆbN−1 − α∆t,
which yields the last inequality in (3.2). The case of α < 0 is treated similarly. Notice that λˆaN = pˆ
b
N = pˆ
b
N−1 and
pˆaN−1 = pˆ
a
N = λˆ
b
N . Thus, the single-period equilibrium we have constructed satisfies:
(3.3) pˆbn ≤ λˆan, λˆbn ≤ pˆan, λˆan+1 < 0, λˆbn+1 > 0,
for n = N − 1. If one of the first two inequalities in (3.3) fails, the agents choose to submit market orders, as
opposed to limit orders, which leads to degeneracy of the LOB – one side of it disappears. If one of the last two
inequalities fails, the execution of a limit order, at any price level, yields a negative relative expected profit for the
agents on one side of the book (given by the expectation in the first or second line of (3.2)). As a result, it becomes
optimal for all such agents to stop posting any limit orders, and the LOB degenerates. The latter is interpreted
as the adverse selection effect. For example, if the third inequality in (3.3) fails, then, every long agent believes
that, no matter the price at which her limit order is posted, if it is executed in the next time period, her expected
execution price at the next time step will be higher than the price at which the limit order is executed. Hence, it
suboptimal to post a limit order at all.
In a single period [N − 1, N ], by choosing small enough ∆t, we can ensure that the inequalities in (3.3) are
satisfied. However, it turns out that, as we progress recursively, constructing an equilibrium, we may encounter a
time step at which one of the inequalities in (3.3) fails, implying that a non-degenerate LTC equilibrium cannot
be constructed for the given time period (at least, using the proposed method). To see this, consider the recursive
equations for (pˆa, λˆa) (which are chosen to satisfy the conditions of Corollary 9.1, in Appendix A, given our
ansatz):
(3.4)
 pˆ
a
n ∈ arg maxp∈R E
((
p− λˆan+1 − ξ
)
1{ξ>p}
)
,
λˆan = λˆ
a
n+1 + α∆t+ E
((
pˆan − λˆan+1 − ξ
)
1{ξ>pˆan)}
)
< 0,
6The execution of limit orders simplifies in the chosen ansatz, because the agents on each side of the book (i.e., long or short) post orders at
the same prices.
7In fact, it is not difficult to prove rigorously that, for any (α, σ), there exists a unique solution to such a system, provided ∆t is small
enough. We omit this result for the sake of brevity.
8This is easy to explain intuitively, as the optimal objective values in the first two lines of (3.2) are of the form C
√
∆t+ αO(∆t).
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and similarly for (pˆb, λˆb). Using the properties of the Gaussian distribution, it is easy to see that, if λˆan+1 < 0,
we have pˆan > 0. Similar conclusion holds for (λˆ
b, pˆb). Thus, if λˆak < 0 < λˆ
b
k, for k = n + 1, . . . , N , our
method allows us to construct a non-degenerate LTC equilibrium on the time interval [n,N ], with pˆb < 0 < pˆa.
Such a construction always succeeds if the agents are market-neutral: i.e., α = 0. Indeed, in this case, assuming
λˆan+1 < 0 < λˆ
b
n+1, we have pˆ
b
n < 0 < pˆ
a
n and
λˆan+1 +
(
E
((
pˆan − λˆan+1 − ξ
)
1{ξ>pˆan)}
))+
= E
(
λˆan+11{ξ>pˆan)}
)
+ E
(
(pˆan − ξ)1{ξ>pˆan)}
)
< 0.
Hence, λˆan < 0, and, similarly, we deduce that λˆ
b
n > 0. By induction, we obtain a non-degenerate LTC equilibrium
on [0, N ], for any (N, σ), as long as α = 0. Corollary 4.1 shows that, as N → ∞, the processes (λˆa, λˆb)
converge to zero, which means that the expected execution prices converge to the fundamental price. The latter is
interpreted as market efficiency in the high-frequency trading regime: any market participant expects to buy or sell
the asset at the fundamental price. The left hand side of Figure 2 shows that the bid and ask prices also converge
to the fundamental price if α = 0. This can be interpreted as a positive liquidity effect of increasing the trading
frequency.
However, the situation is quite different if α 6= 0. Assume, for example, that α > 0. Then, the second line of
(3.4) implies that λˆa increases by, at least, α∆t at each step of the (backward) recursion. Recall that the number
of steps is N = T/∆t, hence, λˆa0 ≥ λˆaN + αT . If |λˆaN | is small (which is typically the case if N is large), then,
we may obtain λˆan+1 ≥ 0, at some time n, which violates the third inequality in (3.3), or, equivalently, implies
that the objective in the first line of (3.4) is strictly negative for all p. The latter implies that it is suboptimal for
the agents with positive inventory to post limit orders, and the proposed method fails to produce a non-degenerate
LTC equilibrium in the interval [n,N ]. Figure 1 shows that this does, indeed, occur. Figures 1 and 2 also show
that, for a given (finite) frequencyN , if |α| is small enough, a non-degenerate equilibrium may still be constructed.
Nevertheless, for any |α| 6= 0, however small it is, there exists a large enough N , s.t. the non-degenerate LTC
equilibrium fails to exist (at least, within the class defined by the proposed method). This is illustrated in Figure 2.
It is important to provide an economic interpretation of why such degeneracy occurs. A careful examination of
Figure 1 reveals that, around the time when λˆa becomes nonnegative, the ask price pˆa explodes. This means that
the agents who want to sell the asset are only willing to sell it at a very high price. Notice also that this price is
several magnitudes larger than the expected change in the fundamental price (represented by the black dashed line
in the left hand side of Figure 1). Hence, such a behavior cannot be justified by the behavior of the fundamental.
Indeed, this is precisely what is called an endogenous liquidity crisis. So, what causes such a liquidity crisis? Recall
that there are two potential reasons for the market to degenerate: agents may choose to submit market orders (if
pˆbn > λˆ
a
n or pˆ
a
n < λˆ
b
n), or they may choose to wait and do nothing (if λˆ
a
n+1 ≥ 0 or λˆbn+1 ≤ 0). The right hand
side of Figure 1 shows that the degeneracy is caused by the second scenario. This means that the naive explanation
of an endogenous liquidity crisis, based on the claim that, in a bullish market, those who need to buy the asset
will submit market orders wiping out liquidity on the sell side of the book, is wrong. Instead, if the agents on the
sell side of the book have the same beliefs, they will increase the ask price so that it is no longer profitable for the
agents who want to buy the asset to submit market buy orders. In fact, the ask price may increase disproportionally
to the expected change in the fundamental price (i.e., the signal), and this is what causes an endogenous liquidity
crisis. The size of the resulting change in the bid or ask price depends not only on the signal, but also on the
trading frequency, which demonstrates the negative liquidity effect of increasing the trading frequency: it fragilizes
the market with respect to deviations of the agents from market-neutrality. The latter, in turn, is explained by the
fact that higher trading frequency exacerbates the adverse selection effect. To see this, consider, e.g., an agent
who is trying to sell one share of the asset. Increasing the trading frequency increases the expected execution
value of this agent, bringing it closer to the fundamental price: this corresponds to λˆa approaching zero (from
below). Assume that the agent posts a limit sell order at a price level p. If this order is executed in the next period,
then, the agent receives p, but, for this to happen, the fundamental price value at the next time step, p0n+1, has to
be above p. On the other hand, the expected execution price of the agent at the next time step is p0n+1 + λˆ
a
n+1.
Thus, the expected relative profit, given the execution of her limit order, is En(p − p0n+1 − λˆan+1 | p0n+1 > p).
The latter expression cannot be positive, unless λˆan+1 < 0 and |λˆan+1| is sufficiently large. Therefore, if |λˆan+1| is
small relative to En(p0n+1 − p | p0n+1 > p), the agent is reluctant to post a limit order at the price level p. Hence,
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p needs to be sufficiently large, to ensure that En(p0n+1 − p | p0n+1 > p) is smaller than |λˆan+1| (in the Gaussian
model of this section, the latter expectation vanishes as p → ∞) – and the extent to which p needs to increase
determines the effect of adverse selection. It turns out that, if the agents are market-neutral (i.e. α = 0), as the
frequency N increases, the quantity En(p0n+1 − p | p0n+1 > p), for any fixed p, converges to zero at the same rate
as |λˆan+1|, hence, the above adverse selection effect does not get amplified. On the contrary, if the agents are not
market-neutral, λˆan+1 reaches zero at some high enough (but finite) frequency, while En(p0n+1 − p | p0n+1 > p)
remains strictly positive, for any finite p, which produces an “infinite” adverse selection effect and causes the
market to degenerate. Of course, so far, these conclusions are based on a very specific example and on a particular
method of constructing an equilibrium. The next section shows that they remain valid in any model (with, possibly,
heterogeneous beliefs) in which the fundamental price is given by an Itoˆ process.
It is worth mentioning that a similar adverse selection effect arises in Goettler et al. (2005), and it is referred
to as the “winner’s curse” in Foucault (1999). However, the latter papers do not investigate the nature of this
phenomenon and focus on other questions instead. In the literature on double auctions (cf. Du & Zhu (2014),
Vayanos (1999)), a similar effect arises when the auction participants choose to decrease their trading activity in
a given auction, because they expect many more opportunities to trade in the future. The latter is similar to the
agents choosing to forgo limit orders and wait, in the present example.
4 Main results
In this section, we generalize the previous conclusions, so that they hold in a general model and for any equilibrium.
As before, we begin with the “limiting” continuous time model. Consider a terminal time horizon T > 0 and a
complete stochastic basis (Ω, F˜ = (F˜t)t∈[0,T ],P), with a Brownian motion W on it.9 We define the adapted
process p˜0 as a continuous modification of
(4.1) p˜0t = p
0
0 +
∫ t
0
σsdWs, p
0
0 ∈ R,
where σ is a progressively measurable locally square integrable process.
Assumption 4.1. There exists a constant C > 1, such that, 1/C ≤ σt ≤ C, for all t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s..
Consider a Borel set of beliefs A and the associated family of measures {Pα}α∈A on (Ω, F˜T ), absolutely
continuous with respect to P. Then, for any α ∈ A, we have
p˜0t = p
0
0 +A
α
t +
∫ t
0
σsdW
α
s , p
0
0 ∈ R, Pα-a.s., ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
whereWα is a Brownian motion under Pα, andAα is a process of finite variation. We assume thatAα is absolutely
continuous: i.e., for any α ∈ A, there exists a locally integrable process µα, such that
Aαt =
∫ t
0
µαs ds, Pα-a.s., ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
Assumption 4.2. For any α ∈ A, the process µα is P-a.s. right-continuous, and there exists a constant C > 0,
such that |µαt | ≤ C, for all t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s..
Thus, we can rewrite the dynamics of p˜0, under each Pα, as follows: Pα-a.s., the following holds for all
t ∈ [0, T ]
(4.2) p˜0t = p
0
0 +
∫ t
0
µαs ds+
∫ t
0
σsdW
α
s , p
0
0 ∈ R.
In addition, we modify the above stochastic integral on a set of Pα-measure zero, so that (4.2) holds for all (t, ω).
In what follows, we often need to analyze the future dynamics of p˜0 under Pα, conditional on F˜t, for various (t, α)
simultaneously. This is why we need the following joint regularity assumption.
9In order to ensure the existence of regular conditional probabilities for the discrete time model, we can, for example, assume that F˜T is
generated by a random element with values in a standard Borel space.
12
Assumption 4.3. There exists a modification of regular conditional probabilities{
P˜αt = Pα
(
· | F˜t
)}
t∈[0,T ], α∈A,
such that it satisfies the tower property with respect to P (as described in Section 2.1).
Assumption 4.3 is satisfied, for example, if Pα ∼ P, for all α ∈ A, or if the set A is countable. Throughout the
rest of the paper, P˜αt refers to a member of the family appearing in Assumption 4.3. All conditional expectations
E˜αt are taken under such P˜αt .
The main results of this section require additional continuity assumptions on σ and µα. The following assump-
tion can be viewed as a stronger version of L2-continuity of σ.
Assumption 4.4. There exists a function ε(·) ≥ 0, such that ε(∆t)→ 0, as ∆t→ 0, and, P-a.s.,
P˜αt
(
Eα
(
(σs∨τ − στ )2 | Fτ
)
≤ ε(∆t)
)
= 1
holds for all t ∈ [0, T −∆t], all s ∈ [t, t+ ∆t], all stopping times t ≤ τ ≤ s, and all α ∈ A.
The above assumption is satisfied, for example, if σ is an Itoˆ process with bounded drift and diffusion coeffi-
cients. Next, we state a continuity assumption on the drift, which can be interpreted as a uniform right-continuity
in probability of the martingale E˜αt µαs .
Assumption 4.5. For any α ∈ A and any t ∈ [0, T ), there exists a deterministic function ε(·) ≥ 0, such that
ε(∆t)→ 0, as ∆t→ 0, and, Pα-a.s.,
P˜αt′
(∣∣∣∣∣
∫ T
t
(
E˜αt′′µαs − E˜αt′µαs
)
ds
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε(∆t)
)
≤ ε(∆t)
holds for all t ≤ t′ ≤ t′′ ≤ t+ ∆t ≤ T .
Notice that Assumptions 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 are not quite standard. Therefore, below, we describe a more specific
(although, still, rather general) diffusion-based framework, in which the Assumptions 4.1–4.5 reduce to standard
regularity conditions on the diffusion coefficients, and are easily verified. To this end, consider a model in which
µαt = µ¯
α(t, Yt), σt = σ¯(t, Yt), and, under P, the process Y is a diffusion taking values in Rd
dYt = Γ(t, Yt)dt+ Σ(t, Yt)dB¯t,
where Γ : [0, T ]×Rd → Rd, Σ = (Σi,j) is a mapping on [0, T ]×Rd with values in the space of d×m matrices,
and B¯ is m-dimensional Brownian motion under P (on the original stochastic basis). We assume that Γ and Σ
possess enough regularity to conclude that Y is a strongly Markov process. Notice that Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2
reduce to the upper and lower bounds on the functions µ¯α and σ¯. Assumption 4.3 is satisfied if we assume that
Pα ∼ P, for all α ∈ A. Let us further assume that the Radon-Nikodym derivative of each measure is in Girsanov
form:
dPα
dP
= exp
(
−1
2
∫ t
0
‖γα(s, Ys)‖2ds+
∫ t
0
γα(s, Ys)dB¯s
)
,
with an Rd-valued function γα, for each α ∈ A. Let us assume that all entries of Γ, γα and Σ are absolutely
bounded by a constant (uniformly over α ∈ A). Assuming, in addition, that σ¯ is globally Lipschitz, we easily verify
Assumption 4.4. In order to verify Assumption 4.5, we assume that the quadratic form generated by A(t, y) :=
Σ(t, y)ΣT (t, y) is bounded away from zero, uniformly over all (t, y), and that the entries of Γ, γα and Σ are
continuously differentiable with absolutely bounded derivatives (uniformly over α ∈ A). Then, the Feynman-Kac
formula implies that, for any t ≤ s,
E˜αt µαs = us,α(t, Yt),
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where us,α is the unique solution to the associated partial differential equation (PDE)
∂tu
s,α +
d∑
i=1
Γα,i∂yiu
s,α +
1
2
d∑
i,j=1
Ai,j∂2yiyju
s,α = 0, (t, y) ∈ (0, s)× Rd, us,α(s, y) = µ¯α(s, y),
and Γα = Γ + Σγα. Assume that, for each s ∈ [0, T ], the function µ¯α(s, ·) is continuously differentiable with
absolutely bounded derivatives, uniformly over all (s, α). Then, the standard Gaussian estimates for derivatives
of the fundamental solution to the above PDE (cf. Theorem 9.4.2 in Friedman (1964)) imply that every ∂yiu
s,α
is absolutely bounded, uniformly over all (s, α). Then, Itoˆ’s formula and Itoˆ’s isometry yield, for all t′ ≤ t′′ and
s ≥ t′:
E˜αt′
(
E˜αt′′µαs − E˜αt′µαs
)2
=
m∑
j=1
∫ t′′∧s
t′
E˜αt′
(
d∑
i=1
∂yiu
s,α(v, Yv)Σ
i,j(v, Yv)
)2
dv ≤ C1(t′′ ∧ s − t′),
with some constant C1 > 0. The above estimate and Jensen’s inequality imply the statement of Assumption 4.5
and complete the description of the diffusion-based setting.
As in Section 3, we also consider a progressively measurable random field D˜, s.t. P-a.s. the function D˜t(·)−
D˜s(·) is strictly decreasing and vanishing at zero, for any 0 ≤ s < t ≤ T . We assume that the demand curve,
D˜t(·)− D˜s(·), cannot be “too flat”.
Assumption 4.6. There exists ε > 0, s.t., for any 0 ≤ t − ε ≤ s < t ≤ T , there exists a F˜s ⊗ B(R)-measurable
random function κs(·), s.t., P-a.s., κs(·) is strictly decreasing and
∣∣∣D˜t(p)− D˜s(p)∣∣∣ ≥ |κs(p)|, for all p ∈ R.
Finally, we introduce the empirical distribution process (µ˜t), with values in the space of finite sigma-additive
measures on S. The next assumption states that every µ˜t is dominated by a deterministic measure.
Assumption 4.7. For any t ∈ [0, T ], there exists a finite sigma-additive measure µ0t on (S,B (S)), s.t., P-a.s., µ˜t
is absolutely continuous w.r.t. µ0t .
We partition the time interval [0, T ] into N subintervals of size ∆t = T/N . A discrete time model is obtained
by discretizing the continuous time one
Fn = F˜n∆t, p0n = p˜0n∆t, Dn(p) = (D˜n∆t − D˜(n−1)∆t)(p− p0n), µn = µ˜n∆t.
Before we present the main results, let us comment on the above assumptions. These assumptions are important
from a technical point of view, however, some of them have economic interpretation that may provide (partial)
intuitive explanations of the results that follow. In particular, Assumption 4.1 ensures that the fundamental price
remains “noisy,” which implies that an agent can execute a limit order very quickly by posting it close to the present
value of p0, if there are no other orders posted there. In combination with Assumption 4.6, the latter implies that,
when the frequency, N , is high, an agent has a lot of opportunities to execute her limit order at a price close to the
fundamental price (at least, if no other orders are posted too close to the fundamental price). Intuitively, this means
that the agent’s execution value should improve as the frequency increases. Assumption 4.5 ensures that, if an
agent has a signal about the direction of the fundamental price, this signal is persistent – i.e., it is continuous in the
appropriate sense. When the trading frequencyN is large, such persistency means that an agent has a large number
of opportunities to exploit the signal, implying that she is in no rush to have her order executed immediately. The
main results of this work, presented below, along with their proofs, confirm that these heuristic conclusions are,
indeed, correct.
As mentioned in the preceding sections, our main goal is to analyze the liquidity effects of increasing the
trading frequency. Therefore, we fix a limiting continuous time model, and consider a sequence of discrete time
models, obtained from the limiting one as described above, for N → ∞. This can be interpreted as observing
the same population of agents, each of whom has a fixed continuous time model for future demand, in various
exchanges that allow for different trading frequencies. We begin with the following theorem, which shows that, if
every market model in a given sequence admits a non-degenerate equilibrium, then, the terminal bid and ask prices
converge to the fundamental price, as the trading frequency goes to infinity.
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Theorem 4.1. Let Assumptions 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.6, 4.7 hold. Consider a family of uniform partitions of a given
time interval [0, T ], with diameters {∆t = T/N > 0} and with the associated family of discrete time models, and
denote the associated fundamental price process by p0,∆t. Assume that every such model admits a non-degenerate
LTC equilibrium, and denote the associated bid and ask prices by pb,∆t and pa,∆t respectively. Then, there exists
a deterministic function ε(·), s.t. ε(∆t) → 0, as ∆t → 0, and, for all small enough ∆t > 0, the following holds
P-a.s.: ∣∣∣pa,∆tN − p0,∆tN ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣pb,∆tN − p0,∆tN ∣∣∣ ≤ ε(∆t)
The above theorem has a useful corollary, which can be interpreted as follows: if the market does not degenerate
as the frequency increases, then, such an increase improves market efficiency. Here, we understand the “improving
efficiency” in the sense that the expected execution price (i.e., the price per share that an agent expects to receive
or pay by the end of the game) of every agent converges to the fundamental price.
Corollary 4.1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.1, denote the support of every equilibrium by A˜∆t and the
associated expected execution prices by λa,∆t and λb,∆t. Then, there exists a deterministic function ε(·), such that
ε(∆t)→ 0, as ∆t→ 0, and, P-a.s.,
sup
n=0,...,N, α∈A˜∆t
(∣∣λa,∆tn (α)− p0,∆tn ∣∣+ ∣∣λb,∆tn (α)− p0,∆tn ∣∣) ≤ ε(∆t),
for all small enough ∆t > 0.
Proof: Denote Eαn = E˜αn∆t. It follows from Corollary 9.1, in Appendix A, and the definition of LTC equilibrium
that λa,∆tN (α) = p
b,∆t
N and λ
b,∆t
N (α) = p
a,∆t
N . It also follows from Corollary 9.1 (or, more generally, from the
definition of a value function) that λa,∆t(α) is a supermartingale, and λb,∆t(α) is a submartingale, under Pα.
Thus, we have: λa,∆tn (α) ≥ Eαnpb,∆tN and λb,∆tn (α) ≤ Eαnpa,∆tN . On the other hand, notice that we must have:
λa,∆tn (α) ≤ Eαnpa,∆tN and λb,∆tn (α) ≥ Eαnpb,∆tN . Assume, for example, that λa,∆tn (α) > Eαnpa,∆tN on the event Ω′
of positive Pα-probability. Consider an agent at state (0, α), who follows the optimal strategy of an agent at state
(1, α), starting from time n and onward, on the event Ω′ (otherwise, she does not do anything). It is easy to see
that the objective value of this strategy is
Eα
(
1Ω′
(
λa,∆tn (α)− Eαnpa,∆tN
))
> 0,
which contradicts Corollary 9.1. The second inequality is shown similarly. Thus, we conclude that, for any
n = 0, . . . , N − 1, both λa,∆n (α) and λb,∆n (α) belong to the interval[
Eαnp
b,∆t
N , E
α
np
a,∆t
N
]
,
which, in turn, converges to zero, as ∆t→ 0, due to the deterministic bounds obtained in the proof of Proposition
4.1.
The results of Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.1 can be viewed as a specific case of a more general observation:
markets become more efficient as the frictions become smaller. In the present setting, the limited trading frequency
is viewed as friction, and the market efficiency is measured by the difference between the bid and ask prices, or
between the expected execution prices. Many more instances of analogous results can be found in the literature,
depending on the choice of a friction type. For example, the markets become efficient in Glosten & Milgrom (1985)
and Kyle (1985) as the number of insiders vanishes. Similarly, the markets become efficient in Du & Zhu (2014)
as the trading frequency increases and the size of private signals vanishes. It is also mentioned in Brunnermeier &
Pedersen (2005) that the market would become efficient if there was no restriction on the size of agents’ inventories
therein.
The above results demonstrate the positive role of high trading frequency. However, they are based on the
assumption that the market does not degenerate as frequency increases. In the context of Section 3, we saw that
the markets do not degenerate only if the agents are market-neutral (i.e. α = 0). If this condition is violated and
the frequency N is sufficiently high, the market does not admit any non-degenerate equilibrium (i.e., there exists
no safe regime, in which the liquidity crisis would never occur). It turns out that this conclusion still holds in the
general setting considered herein.
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Theorem 4.2. Let Assumptions 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 hold. Consider a family of uniform partitions
of a given time interval [0, T ], with diameters {∆t = T/N > 0}, containing arbitrarily small ∆t, and with the
associated family of discrete time models. Assume that every such model admits a non-degenerate LTC equilibrium,
with the same support A˜. Then, for all α ∈ A˜, we have: p˜0 is a martingale under Pα.
The above theorem shows that the market degenerates even if the signal µα is very small (but non-zero),
provided the trading frequencyN is large enough. Therefore, as discussed at the end of Section 3, such degeneracy
cannot be attributed to any fundamental reasons, and we refer to it as the endogenous liquidity crisis. Let us provide
an intuitive (heuristic) argument for why the statement of Theorem 4.2 holds. Assume, first, that all long agents
(i.e., those having positive inventory) are bullish about the asset (i.e., have a positive drift µα). Then, similar to
Section 3, the higher trading frequency amplifies the adverse selection effect, forcing the long agents to withdraw
liquidity from the market (i.e., they prefer to do nothing and wait for a higher fundamental price level). Note that,
in the present setting, the agents may have different beliefs, the LOB may have a complicated shape and dynamics,
and the expected execution prices are no longer deterministic. All this makes it difficult to provide a simple
description of how the high frequency amplifies the adverse selection. Nevertheless, the general analysis of this
case is still based on the idea discussed at the end of Section 3: it has to do with how fast E˜αn∆t(p0n+1−p | p0n+1 > p)
vanishes (as the frequency increases), relative to the rate at which the expected execution prices approach the
fundamental price. Thus, to avoid market degeneracy, there must be a non-zero mass of long agents who are
market-neutral or bearish. As the trading frequency grows, these agents will post their limit orders at lower levels.
Next, assume that there exists a bullish agent (long, short, or with zero inventory). Then, at a sufficiently high
trading frequency, the agent’s expected value of a long position in a single share of the asset will exceed the ask
prices posted by the market-neutral and bearish long agents. In this case, the bullish agent prefers to buy more
shares at the posted ask price, in order to sell them later. As the agents are small and their objectives are linear,
the bullish agent can scale up her strategy to generate infinite expected profits. This contradicts the definition of
optimality and implies that an equilibrium fails to exist. Thus, all agents have to be either market-neutral or bearish.
Applying a symmetric argument, we conclude that all agents must be market-neutral.10 A rigorous formulation of
the above arguments, which constitutes the proof of Theorem 4.2, is given in Section 7.
It is worth mentioning that the possible degeneracy of the LOB is also documented in Glosten & Milgrom
(1985), and is referred to as a “market shut down”. The setting used in the latter paper is very different: it analyzes
a quote-driven exchange (i.e., the one with a designated market maker) and assumes the existence of insiders with
superior information. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw a parallel with the LOB degeneracy in the present setting.
Namely, the degeneracy in Glosten & Milgrom (1985) occurs when the number of insiders increases, which implies
that the signal, generated by the insiders’ trading, becomes sufficiently large. The latter is similar to the deviation
from martingality of the fundamental price in the present setting. However, an increase in the number of insiders
in Glosten & Milgrom (1985) also implies an increase in frictions (since the insiders can be interpreted as friction
in Glosten & Milgrom (1985)). Theorem 4.2, on the other hand, states that a market degeneracy will occur when
the frictions are sufficiently small. Perhaps, this dual role of the number of insiders did not allow for a detailed
analysis of market shut downs in Glosten & Milgrom (1985). Many other models of market microstructure (cf.
Goettler et al. (2005), Rosu (2009), Parlour (1998), Foucault (1999), Du & Zhu (2014)) are not well suited for the
analysis of market degeneracy, either because the agents in these models pursue “one-shot” strategies (i.e., they
cannot choose to wait and post a limit order later) or because the fundamental price (or its analogue) is restricted
to be a martingale.
5 Conditional tails of the marginal distributions of Itoˆ processes
As follows from the discussion in the preceding sections, in order to prove the main results of the paper, we need
to investigate the properties of marginal distributions of the fundamental price p˜0 (more precisely, the distributions
of its increments). In order to prove Theorem 4.1, we need to show that the difference between the fundamental
price and the bid or ask prices converges to zero, as the frequency N increases to infinity. It turns out that, for this
10This argument, along with the fact that Definition 2.2 requires an optimal control to be optimal for all α, explains why the statement of
Theorem 4.2 holds for all, as opposed to µn-a.e., α ∈ A˜.
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purpose, it suffices to show that the distribution of a normalized increment of p˜0 converges to the standard normal
distribution. The following lemma summarizes these results. It is rather simple, but technical, hence, its proof is
postponed to Appendix B. In order to formulate the result (and to facilitate the derivations in subsequent sections),
we introduce addiitonal notation. For notational convenience, we drop the superscript ∆t for some variables (we
only emphasize this dependence when it is important). For any market model on the time interval [0, T ], associated
with a uniform partition with diameter ∆t = T/N > 0, and having a fundamental price process p0, we define
(5.1) ξn = p0n − p0n−1 = p˜0tn − p˜0tn−1 , Eαn = E˜αtn , Pαn = P˜αtn , tn = n∆t, n = 1, . . . , NT/∆t.
We denote by η0 a standard normal random variable (on a, possibly, extended probability space), which is inde-
pendent of FN under every Pα.
Lemma 5.1. Let Assumptions 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 hold. Then, there exists a function ε(·) ≥ 0, s.t. ε(∆t) → 0, as
∆t→ 0, and the following holds P-a.s., for all p ∈ R, all α ∈ A, and all n = 1, . . . , N ,
(i) (|p| ∨ 1)
∣∣∣Pαn−1 ( ξn√∆t > p)− Pαn−1 (σtn−1η0 > p)∣∣∣ ≤ ε(∆t),
(ii)
∣∣∣Eαn−1 ( ξn√∆t1{ξn/√∆t>p})− Eαn−1 (σtn−1η01{σtn−1η0>p})∣∣∣ ≤ ε(∆t).
In addition, the above estimates hold if we replace (ξn, η0, p) by (−ξn,−η0,−p).
In order to prove Theorem 4.2 we need to compare the rates at which the conditional expectations Eαn(p0n+1 −
p | p0n+1 > p) vanish (as the frequency N goes to infinity) to the rate at which the expected execution prices
converge to the fundamental price. This requires a more delicate analysis – in particular, the mere proximity of
the distribution of a (normalized) fundamental price increment to the Gaussian distribution is no longer sufficient.
In fact, what we need is a precise uniform estimate of the conditional tail of the distribution of a fundamental
price increment. The desired property is formulated in the following lemma, which, we believe, is valuable in its
own right. This result enables us to estimate the tails of the conditional marginal distribution of an Itoˆ process X
uniformly by an exponential. To the best of our knowledge, this result is new. The main difficulties in establishing
the desired estimates are: (a) the fact that we estimate the conditional, as opposed to the regular, tail, and (b) the
fact that the estimates need to be uniform over the values of the argument. Note that, even in the case of a diffusion
process X , the classical Gaussian-type bounds for the tails of the marginal distributions of X are not sufficient to
establish the desired estimates. The reason is that, in general, the Gaussian estimates of the regular tails from above
and from below have different orders of decay, for the large values of the argument, which makes them useless for
estimating the conditional tail (which is a ratio of two regular tails).
Lemma 5.2. Consider the following continuous semimartingale on a stochastic basis (Ωˆ, (Fˆt)t∈[0,1], Pˆ):
Xt =
∫ t
0
µˆudu+
∫ t
0
σˆudBu, t ∈ [0, 1],
where B is a Brownian motion (with respect to the given stochastic basis), µˆ and σˆ are progressively measurable
processes, such that the above integrals are well defined. Assume that, for any stopping time τ with values in [0, 1],
c ≤ |σˆτ | ≤ C holds a.s. with some constants c, C > 0. Then, there exists ε > 0, depending only on (c, C), s.t., if
µˆ2τ ≤ ε, Eˆ
(
(σˆs∨τ − σˆτ )2 | Fˆτ
)
≤ ε a.s.,
for all s ∈ [0, 1] and all stopping time τ , with values in [0, 1], then, for any c1 > 0, there exists C1 > 0, depending
only on (c, C, ε, c1), s.t. the following holds:
Pˆ(X1 > x+ z |X1 > x) ≤ C1e−c1z, ∀x, z ≥ 0.
Proof: In the course of this proof, we will use the shorthand notation, Eˆτ and Pˆτ , to denote the conditional
expectation and the conditional probability w.r.t Fˆτ . We also denote
At =
∫ t
0
µˆudu, Gt =
∫ t
0
σˆudBu.
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For any x ≥ 0, let us introduce τx = 1 ∧ inf {t ∈ [0, 1] : Xt = x}. Then
Pˆ(X1 > x+ z) ≤ Pˆ( sup
t∈[0,1]
Xt > x+ z) = Eˆ
(
1{τx<1}Pˆτx
(
sup
s∈[τx,1]
(Xs − x) > z
))
Notice that, on {τx ≤ s}, we have: Xs − x = As∨τx − Aτx + Gs∨τx −Gτx . In addition, the process (Y )s∈[0,1],
with Ys = As∨τx−Aτx , is adapted to the filtration (Fˆτx∨s), while the process (Z)s∈[0,1], with Zs = Gs∨τx−Gτx ,
is a martingale with respect to it. Next, on {τx < 1}, we have:
Pˆτx
(
sup
s∈[τx,1]
(Xs − x) > z
)
= Pˆτx
(
sup
s∈[0,1]
(Ys + Zs) > z
)
≤ Pˆτx
(
sup
s∈[0,1]
exp
(
c1Zs − 1
2
c21〈Z〉s
)
> exp
(
c1z − c1
√
ε− 1
2
c21C
2
))
,
where we used the fact that 〈Z〉s ≤ 〈X〉1 ≤ C2, for all s ∈ [0, 1]. Using the Novikov’s condition, it is easy to
check that
Ms = exp
(
c1Zs − 1
2
c21〈Z〉s
)
, s ∈ [0, 1],
is a true martingale, and, hence, we can apply the Doob’s martingale inequality to obtain, on {τx < 1}:
Pˆτx
(
sup
s∈[0,1]
exp
(
c1Zs − 1
2
c21〈Z〉s
)
> exp
(
c1z − c1
√
ε− 1
2
c21C
2
))
≤ exp
(
−c1z + c1
√
ε+
1
2
c21C
2
)
.
Collecting the above inequalities, we obtain
(5.2) Pˆ(X1 > x+ z) ≤ Pˆ( sup
t∈[0,1]
Xt > x+ z) ≤ C2(ε)e−c1zPˆ(τx < 1) = C2(ε)e−c1zPˆ( sup
t∈[0,1]
Xt > x).
The next step is to estimate the distribution tails of a running maximum via the tails of the distribution of X1. To
do this, we proceed as before:
(5.3) Pˆ(X1 > x) = Eˆ
(
1{τx<1}Pˆτx (Y1 + Z1 > 0)
)
,
with Y and Z defined above. Notice that, on {τx < 1},
Pˆτx (Y1 + Z1 > 0) = Pˆτx
(
σˆτx
B1 −Bτx√
1− τx
+
1√
1− τx
∫ 1
τx
µˆudu+
1√
1− τx
∫ 1
0
(σˆu∨τx − σˆτx)dBxu > 0
)
,
where Bxs = Bs∨τx is a continuous square-integrable martingale with respect to (Fˆs∨τx). Denote
Rs =
∫ s
0
(σˆu∨τx − σˆτx)dBxu, s ∈ [0, 1],
and notice that it is a square-integrable martingale with respect to (Fˆs∨τx). Then, on {τx < 1} (possibly, without
a set of measure zero), we have:
Eˆτx
(
1√
1− τx
R1
)2
=
1
1− τx EˆτxR
2
1 ≤
1
1− τx
∫ 1
τx
Eˆτx(σˆu∨τx − σˆτx)2du ≤ ε.
In addition,
Eˆτx
(
1√
1− τx
∫ 1
τx
µˆudu
)2
≤ ε.
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Collecting the above and using Chebyshev’s inequality, we obtain, on {τx < 1}:∣∣∣∣Pˆτx (Y1 + Z1 > 0)− Pˆτx (σˆτxB1 −Bτx√1− τx ≤ −ε1/3
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2ε1/6.
On the other hand, due to the strong Markov property of Brownian motion, on {τx < 1}, we have, a.s.:
Pˆτx
(
σˆτx
B1 −Bτx√
1− τx
≤ −ε1/3
)
= Pˆ
(
ξ ≤ −ε
1/3
σ
)∣∣∣∣
σ=σˆτx
,
where ξ is a standard normal. As σˆτx ∈ [c, C], we conclude that the right hand side of the above converges to 1/2,
as ε → 0, uniformly over almost all random outcomes in {τx < 1}. In particular, for all small enough ε > 0, we
have:
1{τx<1}
∣∣∣Pˆτx (Y1 + Z1 ≤ 0)− Pˆτx (Y1 + Z1 > 0)∣∣∣ ≤ 1{τx<1}δ(ε) < 1,
and, in view of (5.3),
Pˆ(X1 > x) ≥ Eˆ
(
1{τx<1}Pˆτx (Y1 + Z1 ≤ 0)
)
− δ(ε)Pˆ(τx < 1)
Summing up the above inequality and (5.3), we obtain
2Pˆ(X1 > x) ≥ (1− δ(ε))Pˆ(τx < 1) = (1− δ(ε))Pˆ( sup
t∈[0,1]
Xt > x),
which, along with (5.2), yields the statement of the lemma.
6 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Within the scope of this proof, we adopt the notation introduced in (5.1) and use the following convention.
Notational Convention 6.1. The LOB, the bid and ask prices, the expected execution prices, and the demand, are
all measured relative to p0. Namely, we use νn to denote νn ◦ (x 7→ x+ p0n)−1, pan to denote pan− p0n, pbn to denote
pbn − p0n, λan to denote λan − p0n, λbn to denote λbn − p0n, and Dn(p) to denote Dn(p0n + p).
Herein, we are only concerned with what happens in the last trading period – at time (N−1), whereN = T/∆t.
Hence, we omit the subscriptN−1 whenever it is clear from the context. In particular, we write pa and pb for paN−1
and pbN−1, ν for νN−1, and ξ for ξN . Note also that, in an LTC equilibrium, we have: p
a = paN = p
a
N−1, with
similar equalities for pb and ν. For convenience, we also drop the superscript ∆t in the LOB and the associated
bid and ask prices. Finally, we denote by A˜ the support of a given equilibrium. As the roles of pa and pb in our
model are symmetric, we will only prove the statement of the proposition for pb. We are going to show that, under
the assumptions of the theorem, there exists a constant C0 > 0, depending only on the constant C in Assumptions
4.1 and 4.2, such that, for all small enough ∆t, we have, P-a.s.:
(6.1) − C0 ≤ pb/
√
∆t < 0
First, we introduce Aˆα(p;x), which we refer to as the simplified objective:
(6.2) Aˆα(p;x) = EαN−1
(
(p− x− ξ)1{ξ>p}
)
.
Recall that the expected relative profit from posting a limit sell order at price level p, in the last time period,11 is
given by Aα(p; pbN ), where
(6.3) Aα(p;x) = EαN−1
(
(p− x− ξ)1{D+N (p−ξ)>ν+((−∞,p))}
)
.
11Recall that everything is measured relative to the fundamental price, according to the Notational Convention 6.1
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The simplified objective is similar to Aα, but it assumes that there are no orders posted at better prices than the
one posted by the agent. In particular, Aˆα(p;x) = Aα(p;x) for p ≤ pa. Corollary 9.1, in Appendix A, states that,
in equilibrium, P-a.s., if the agents in the state (s, α) post limit sell orders, then they post them at a price level p
that maximizes the true objective Aα(p; pb). The following lemma shows that the value of the modified objective
becomes close to the value of the true objective, for the agents posting limit sell orders close to the ask price.
Lemma 6.1. P-a.s., either ν+({pa}) > 0 or we have:∣∣∣Aα(p; pb)− Aˆα(pa; pb)∣∣∣→ 0,
as p ↓ pa, uniformly over all α ∈ A˜.
Proof: If ν+({pa}) = 0, then ν+ is continuous at pa, and ν+((−∞, p])→ 0, as p ↓ pa. Then, we have∣∣∣Aα(p; pb)− Aˆα(pa; pb)∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣EαN−1 ((p− pb − ξ)1{D+N (p−ξ)>ν+((−∞,p))})− EαN−1 ((pa − pb − ξ)1{ξ>pa})∣∣∣
≤ |p− pa|+ ∥∥pa − pb − ξ∥∥L2(PαN−1) PαN−1 (ξ > pa, D+N (p− ξ) ≤ ν+((−∞, p)))
Thus, it suffices to show that: (i)
∥∥pa − pb − ξ∥∥L2(PαN−1) is bounded by a finite random variable independent of α,
and (ii)
PαN−1
(
ξN > p
a, D+N (p− ξ) ≤ ν+((−∞, p))
)→ 0, P-a.s.,
as p ↓ pa, uniformly over α. For (i), we have:∥∥pa − pb − ξ∥∥L2(PαN−1) ≤ |pa − pb|+ ‖ξ‖L2(PαN−1) ≤ |pa − pb|+ 2C√∆t,
where the constant C appears in Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2. For (ii), we note that
{ξN > pa, D+N (p− ξ) ≤ ν+((−∞, p))} = {ξN > pa, ξ ≤ p−D−1N
(
ν+((−∞, p)))},
as DN (·) is strictly decreasing, with DN (0) = 0. Assumption 4.6 implies that
κ−1(ν+((−∞, p))) ≤ D−1N (ν+((−∞, p))) < 0,
where κ is known at time N − 1. Therefore,
PαN−1
(
ξ > pa, D+N (p− ξ) ≤ ν+((−∞, p))
) ≤ PαN−1 (ξ ∈ (pa, p− κ−1(ν+((−∞, p)))]) .
It remains to show that, P-a.s., the right hand side of the above converges to zero, uniformly over all α. Assume
that it does not hold. Then, with positive probability P, there exists ε > 0 and a sequence of (pk, αk), such that
pk ↓ pa and
PαkN−1
(
ξ ∈ (pa, pk − κ−1(ν+((−∞, pk)))]
) ≥ ε.
Notice that, P-a.s., the family of measures
{
µˆk = PαkN−1 ◦ ξ−1
}
k
is tight. The latter follows, for example, from the
fact that, P-a.s., the conditional second moments of ξ are bounded uniformly over all α (which, in turn, is a standard
exercise in stochastic calculus). Prokhorov’s theorem, then, implies that there is a subsequence of these measures
that converges weakly to some measure µˆ on R. Next, notice that, for any fixed k in the chosen subsequence, there
exists a large enough k′, such that∣∣µˆ ((pa, pk − κ−1(ν+((−∞, pk)))])− µk′ ((pa, pk − κ−1(ν+((−∞, pk)))])∣∣ ≤ ε/2.
Thus, for any k in the subsequence, we have
µˆ
((
pa, pk − κ−1(ν+((−∞, pk)))
]) ≥ ε/2.
The above is a contradiction, as the intersection of the corresponding intervals, (pa, pk − κ−1(ν+((−∞, pk)))],
over all k is empty.
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Now we are ready to prove the upper bound in (6.1).
Lemma 6.2. In any non-degenerate LTC equilibrium, pb < 0 < pa, P-a.s..
Proof: We only show that pb < 0 holds, the other inequality being very similar. Assume that pb ≥ 0 on some
positive P-probability set Ω′ ∈ FN−1. We are going to show that this results in a contradiction. First, Corollary
9.1, in Appendix A, implies that, P-a.s., if the agents in state (s, α) post a limit sell order, then we must have:
sup
p∈R
Aα(p; pb) ≥ 0. In addition, on Ω′, we have: Aˆα(pa; pb) < 0 for all α ∈ A˜, as ξ has full support in R under
every PαN−1 (which, in turn, follows from the fact that σ is bounded uniformly away from zero). Then, Lemma 6.1
implies that there exists a FN−1-measurable p¯ ≥ pa, such that, on Ω′, the following holds a.s.: if ν+({pa}) = 0
then p¯ > pa, and, in all cases,
(6.4) Aα(p; pb) < 0, ∀p ∈ [pa, p¯], ∀α ∈ A˜
Clearly, it is suboptimal for an agent to post a limit sell order below p¯. However, an agent’s strategy only needs
to be optimal up to a set of P-measure zero, and these sets can be different for different (s, α). Therefore, a little
more work is required to obtain the desired contradiction. Consider the set B ⊂ Ω′ × R× A˜:
B = {(ω, s, α) | qˆ(s, α) > 0, pˆ(s, α) ≤ p¯} .
This set is measurable with respect to FN−1 ⊗ B
(
R× A˜
)
, due to the measurability properties of qˆ and pˆ. Notice
that, due to the above discussion and the optimality of agents’ actions (cf. Corollary 9.1, in Appendix A), for any
(s, α) ∈ R× A˜, we have:
P({ω | (ω, s, α) ∈ B}) = 0,
and hence
EN−1
∫
R×A˜
1B(ω, s, α)µN−1(ds, dα) =
∫
R×A˜
EN−1 (1B(ω, s, α)ρN−1(ω, s, α))µ0N−1(ds, dα) = 0,
where ρN−1 is the Radon-Nikodym density of µN−1 w.r.t. to the deterministic measure µ0N−1 (cf. Assumption
4.7). The above implies that, PN−1-a.s., 1B(ω, s, α)ρN−1(ω, s, α) = 0, for µ0N−1-a.e. (s, α). Notice also that,
for all (ω, s, α) ∈ Ω′ × R× A˜,
1{pˆ(s,α)≤p¯}qˆ+(s, α)1Bc = 0.
From the above observations and the condition (2.4) in the definition of equilibrium (cf. Definition 2.4), we
conclude that, on Ω′, the following holds a.s.:
ν+([pa, p¯]) = 0,
where p¯ ≥ pa, and, if ν+({pa}) = 0, then p¯ > pa. This contradicts the definition of pa (recall that pa is P-a.s.
finite, due to non-degeneracy of the LOB).
It only remains to prove the lower bound on pb in (6.1). Assume that it does not hold. That is, assume that
there exists a family of equilibria, with arbitrary small ∆t, and positive P-probability FN−1-measurable sets Ω∆t,
such that pb < −C0
√
∆t on Ω∆t. We are going to show that this leads to a contradiction with pa > 0. To this end,
assume that the agents maximize the simplified objective function, Aˆα, instead of the true one, Aα. Then, if pb is
negative enough, the optimal price levels become negative for all α. The precise formulation of this is given by the
following lemma.
Lemma 6.3. There exists a constant C0 > 0, s.t., for any small enough ∆t, there exist constants , δ > 0, s.t.,
P-a.s., we have
Aˆα(−δ;x) ≥ + sup
y≥0
Aˆα(y;x),
for all α ∈ A˜ and all x ≤ −C0
√
∆t.
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Proof: Denote ξ¯ = ξ/
√
∆t and consider the random function
A¯α(p;x) = EαN−1
(
(p− x− ξ¯)1{ξ¯>p}
)
.
Notice that
Aˆα(p;x) =
√
∆tA¯α
(
p/
√
∆t;x/
√
∆t
)
,
and, hence, we can reformulate the statement of the lemma as follows: there exists a constant C0 > 0, s.t., for any
small enough ∆t, there exist constants , δ > 0, s.t., P-a.s., we have
A¯α(−δ;x) ≥ + sup
y≥0
A¯α(y;x),
for all α ∈ A˜ and all x ≤ −C0. Notice that
A¯α(−δ;x)−A¯α(y;x) = −xEαN−1
(
1{−δ<ξ¯≤y}
)
−EαN−1
(
ξ1{−δ<ξ¯≤y}
)
−δEαN−1
(
1{ξ¯>−δ}
)
−yEαN−1
(
1{ξ¯>y}
)
is non-increasing in x, and, hence, such is A¯α(−δ;x) − sup
y≥0
A¯α(y;x). Hence, it suffices to prove the above
statement for x = −C0. Next, consider the deterministic function Aσ(p;x), defined via
(6.5) Aσ(p;x) = Eˆ
(
(p− x− ση0)1{ση0>p}
)
,
where η0 is a standard normal random variable on some auxiliary probability space (Ωˆ, Pˆ). It follows from Lemma
5.1 that there exists a function ε2(·) ≥ 0, s.t. ε2(∆t)→ 0, as ∆t→ 0, and, P-a.s., we have∣∣∣A¯α(p;−C0)−AσtN−1 (p;−C0)∣∣∣ ≤ ε2(∆t),
for all α ∈ A˜ and all p ∈ R. Then, as we can always choose ∆t small enough, so that ε2(∆t) < , the statements
of the lemma would follow if we can show that there exist constants , δ, C0 > 0, s.t., P-a.s.,
AσtN−1 (−δ;−C0) ≥ 3+ sup
y≥0
AσtN−1 (y;−C0)
As σtN−1(ω) ∈ [1/C,C], P-a.s., it suffices to find , δ, C0 > 0, s.t.
Aσ(−δ;−C0) ≥ 3+ sup
y≥0
Aσ(y;−C0), ∀σ ∈ [1/C,C].
Note that the above inequality does not involve ω or ξ, and it is simply a property of a deterministic function.
Notice also that Aσ(p;x) = σA1 (p/σ;x/σ), with A1 given in (6.5). Then, if we denote by F (x) and f(x),
respectively, the cdf and pdf of a standard normal, we obtain
A1(p;x) = (p− x)(1− F (p))−
∫ ∞
p
tf(t)dt.
A straightforward calculation gives us the following useful properties of A1 and Aσ
(i) For any σ > 0 and any x < 0, the function p 7→ Aσ(p;x) has a unique maximizer pσ(x), in particular, it is
increasing in p ≤ pσ(x) and decreasing in p ≥ pσ(x).
(ii) The function
x 7→ pσ(x) = σp1(x/σ) = σ ((1− F )/f)−1 (−x/σ)
is increasing in x < 0 and converges to −∞, as x→ −∞.
Then, choosingC0 large enough, so that p1(−C0/C) < 0, ensures pσ(−C0) < 0, for all σ ∈ [1/C,C]. Setting
δ = −p1(−C0/C)/C guarantees that pσ(−C0) ≤ −δ, for all σ ∈ [1/C,C]. Then, by property (i) above, we have,
for all σ ∈ [1/C,C]
Aσ(−δ;−C0) > Aσ(0;−C0) = sup
y≥0
Aσ(y;−C0).
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Finally, as Aσ(−δ;−C0)−Aσ(0;−C0) is a continuous function of σ ∈ [1/C,C], we can find , such that
Aσ(−δ;−C0) ≥ 3+ sup
y≥0
Aσ(y;−C0), ∀σ ∈ [1/C,C].
Recall that our assumption is that pb < −C0
√
∆t holds on a set Ω∆t of positive P-measure. Recall also that
pa > 0, P-a.s., due to Lemma 6.2. Then, Lemmas 6.1 and 6.3 imply that there exists FN−1-measurable p¯ ≥ pa,
s.t., on Ω∆t, we have a.s.: if ν+({pa}) = 0 then p¯ > pa, and, in all cases,
Aα(p; pb) < sup
p′∈R
Aα(p′; pb), ∀p ∈ [pa, p¯], ∀α ∈ A˜.
It is intuitively clear that posting limit sell orders at the above price levels p must be suboptimal for the agents.
However, the above inequality, on its own, does not yield a contradiction, as the agents’ strategies are only optimal
up to a set of P-probability zero, and these sets may be different for different states (s, α). To obtain a contradiction
with the definition of pa, we simply repeat the last part of the proof of Lemma 6.2 (following equation (6.4)). This
ensures that (6.1) holds and completes the proof of the theorem.
7 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Within the scope of this proof, we adopt the notation introduced in (5.1) and use Notational Convention 6.1 (i.e.
we measure the LOB, the expected execution prices, and the demand, relative to p0, but keep the same variables’
names). Assume that the statement of the theorem does not hold: i.e., there exists α0 ∈ A˜, such that p˜0 is not a
martingale under Pα0 . Then, there exists s ∈ [0, T ), s.t., with positive probability Pα0 , we have
E˜α0s p˜0T 6= p˜0s.
Without loss of generality, we assume that there exists a constant δ > 0 and a set Ω′ ∈ Fs, having positive
probability Pα0 (and hence P), s.t., for all random outcomes in Ω′, we have
(7.1) E˜α0s (p˜0T − p˜0s) ≥ δ
(the case of negative values is analogous). Next, we fix an arbitrary ∆t from a given family and consider the
associated non-degenerate LTC equilibrium.
Lemma 7.1. There exists a deterministic function ε(·) ≥ 0, s.t. ε(∆t)→ 0, as ∆t→ 0, and, for any small enough
∆t > 0, there exists n = 0, . . . , N − 3 and Ω′′ ∈ Fn, s.t. Pα0n (Ω′′) > 0 and the following holds on Ω′′
Pα0n+2
(
Eα0n+3
(
p0N − p0n+3
) ≤ δ/2) ≤ ε(∆t).
Proof: The proof follows from Assumption 4.5. Consider t = t′ = s and t′′ = tn+2. Then, Assumption 4.5
implies
P˜α0s
(∣∣∣∣∣E˜α0tn+2
∫ T
s
µα0u du− E˜α0s
∫ T
s
µα0u du
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε(∆t)
)
≤ ε(∆t)
on Ω′, a.s.. Notice also that
E˜α0s (p˜0T − p˜0s) = E˜α0s
T∫
s
µα0u du.
Then, assuming that ε(∆t) is small enough and recalling (7.1), we obtain
P˜α0s
(
E˜α0tn+2
∫ T
s
µα0u du ≤ 3δ/4
)
≤ ε(∆t),
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on Ω′. Therefore, there exists a set Ω′′ ∈ Fs ⊂ Ftn , s.t. P˜α0tn (Ω′′) > 0 and
E˜α0tn+2
∫ T
s
µα0u du ≥ 3δ/4,
on Ω′′. Next, we choose t = s, t′ = tn+2, t′′ = tn+3, and use Assumption 4.5, to obtain
P˜α0tn+2
(∣∣∣∣∣E˜α0tn+3
∫ T
s
µα0u du− E˜α0tn+2
∫ T
s
µα0u du
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε(∆t)
)
≤ ε(∆t),
on Ω′′, a.s.. Assuming that ε(∆t) is small enough and using the last two inequalities, we obtain
P˜α0tn+2
(
E˜α0tn+3
∫ T
s
µα0u du ≤ δ/2
)
≤ ε(∆t).
Finally, due to Assumption 4.2, and as ∆t is small, we can replace
∫ T
s
µα0u du by
∫ T
tn+3
µα0u du, and δ/2 by δ/4, in
the above equation. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Using the strategy at which the agent in state (1, α0) waits until the last moment n = N , we conclude that the
process (λan(α0) + p
0
n) must be a supermartingale under Pα0 . More precisely, due to the definition of an optimal
strategy, we have, P-a.s.
λan+2(α0) ≥ Eα0n+2λaN (α0) + Eα0n+2
(
Eα0n+3(p
0
N − p0n+3) + ξn+3
)
.
Recall that λaN (α0) = p
b
N and, due to Theorem 4.1 (more precisely, it follows from the proof of the theorem),
there exists a constant C0 > 0, s.t., for all small enough ∆t > 0, the following holds P-a.s.
−C0
√
∆t ≤ pbN < 0 < paN ≤ C0
√
∆t.
Thus, we have, P-a.s.
(7.2) λan+2(α0) ≥ −C0
√
∆t+ Eα0n+2
(
Eα0n+3(p
0
N − p0n+3)
)
+ Eα0n+2ξn+3.
Due to Assumption 4.2, we have, P-a.s.
Eα0n+2ξn+3 ≤ C∆t,
∣∣Eα0n+3(p0N − p0n+3)∣∣ ≤ CT,
and, hence,
λan+2(α0) ≥ −C0
√
∆t+ CT + C∆t.
In addition, making use of Lemma 7.1, we conclude that, for any small enough ∆t, there exist n = 0, . . . , N − 2
and Ω′′ ∈ Fn, s.t. Pα0n (Ω′′) > 0 and
Pαn+2
(
Eαn+3
(
p0N − p0n+3
) ≤ δ/2) ≤ ε(∆t), on Ω′′.
Using (7.2) and assuming that ∆t is small enough, we obtain
λan+2(α0) ≥ δ/4, on Ω′′.
Next, Corollary 9.1, in Appendix A, implies that, P-a.s.,
pbn+1 ≥ Eα0n+1
(
λan+2(α0) + ξn+2
∣∣ξn+2 < pbn+1) .
Thus, on Ω′′, we obtain
(7.3) pbn+1 − Eα0n+1
(
ξn+2
∣∣ξn+2 < pbn+1) ≥ δ/4.
The following lemma shows that, for any number p, the conditional expectation of the fundamental price
increment, Eα0n+1(ξn+2|ξn+2 < p), approaches p as the size of the time interval vanishes. This result follows from
Lemma 5.2.
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Lemma 7.2. There exists a constant C3 > 0, s.t., for all small enough ∆t > 0, and for any t ∈ [0, T −∆t], the
following holds P-a.s.
sup
p≤0
∣∣∣p− E˜α0t (p˜0t+∆t − p˜0t ∣∣ p˜0t+∆t − p˜0t < p)∣∣∣ ≤ C3√∆t.
Proof: Fix t and ∆t > 0 and consider the evolution of p˜0s, for s ∈ [t, t+ ∆t], under Pα0t
p˜0s − p˜0t =
∫ s
t
µα0u du+
∫ s
t
σudW
α0
u ,
where Wα0 is a Brownian motion under Pα0 . Rescaling by
√
∆t, we obtain
(p˜0s − p˜0t )/
√
∆t = X(s−t)/∆t, Xs =
∫ s
0
µˆudu+
∫ s
0
σˆudWˆu, s ∈ [0, 1],
with
µˆs =
√
∆t µα0t+s∆t, σˆs = σt+s∆t, Wˆs =
1√
∆t
(
Wα0t+s∆t −Wα0t
)
, s ∈ [0, 1].
Notice that the above processes are adapted to the new filtration Fˆ, with Fˆs = F˜t+s∆t, and, P-a.s., under P˜α0t , Wˆ
is a Brownian motion with respect to Fˆ. Next, due to Assumptions 4.1 and 4.4, for any small enough ∆t > 0,
P-a.s., the dynamics of (−Xs), under P˜α0t , satisfy all the assumptions of Lemma 5.2. As a result, we obtain
P˜α0t (X1 < −x− z) ≤ C1e−zP˜α0t (X1 < −x), ∀x, z ≥ 0.
Finally, we notice that
sup
p≤0
∣∣∣p− E˜α0t (p˜0t+∆t − p˜0t ∣∣p˜0t+∆t − p˜0t < p)∣∣∣ = √∆t sup
p≤0
∣∣∣p− E˜α0t (X1∣∣X1 < p)∣∣∣
=
√
∆t sup
p≤0
∣∣∣∣∣p−
∫∞
−p x d P˜
α0
t (X1 < −x)
P˜α0t (X1 < p)
∣∣∣∣∣ = √∆t supp≤0
∣∣∣∣∣
∫∞
0
P˜α0t (X1 < p− z)dz
P˜α0t (X1 < p)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ C1√∆t,
which completes the proof of the lemma.
Using (7.3) and Lemma 7.2, we conclude that, for all small enough ∆t, we have: pbn+1 > 0 on Ω
′′, P-a.s.. In
addition, Corollary 9.1, in Appendix A, implies that, for any α ∈ A˜, the following holds P-a.s.
λan+1(α) ≥ pbn+1.
Next, with a slight abuse of notation (similar notation was introduced in the proof of Proposition 4.1), we consider
the simplified objective of an agent who posts a limit sell order at the ask price pan
Aˆα(pan;λ
a
n+1) = Eαn
(
pan − λan+1 − ξn+1 | ξn+1 > pan
)
.
The above estimates imply that, on Ω′′, we have, P-a.s.
(7.4) Aˆα(pan;λ
a
n+1) ≤ Eαn (pan − ξn+1 | ξn+1 > pan)− Eαn
(
pbn+11Ω′′ | ξn+1 > pan
)
< 0, ∀α ∈ A˜.
To obtain the last inequality in the above, we recall that Ω′′ ∈ Fn and, P-a.s., 1Ω′′Pn(Ω \ Ω′′) = 0, pbn+1 > 0 on
Ω′′, and Pαn(ξn+1 > pan) > 0, for all α ∈ A˜. Next, repeating the proof of Lemma 6.1 (and using the fact that λan+1
is absolutely bounded, as shown in Corollary 4.1), we conclude that, P-a.s., either ν+n ({pan}) > 0, or we have∣∣∣Aα(p;λan+1)− Aˆα(pan;λan+1)∣∣∣→ 0,
as p ↓ pa, uniformly over all α ∈ A˜, where we introduce the true objective,
Aα(p;λan+1) = Eαn
((
p− λan+1 − ξn+1
)
1{D+n+1(p−ξn+1)>ν+n ((−∞,p))}
)
.
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This convergence, along with (7.4), implies that there exists a Fn-measurable p¯ ≥ pan, such that, on Ω′′, the
following holds P-a.s.: if ν+n ({pan}) = 0 then p¯ > pan, and, in all cases,
Aα(p;λan+1) < 0, ∀p ∈ [pan, p¯], ∀α ∈ A˜.
Finally, we repeat the last part of the proof of Lemma 6.2 (following equation (6.4)), to obtain a contradiction
with the definition of pan, and complete the proof of the theorem. The last argument also shows that, when ∆t is
small enough, it becomes suboptimal for the agents to post limit sell orders, as the expected relative profit from
this action becomes negative, causing the market to degenerate.
8 Summary and future work
In this paper, we present a new framework for modeling market microstructure, which does not require the exis-
tence of a designate market maker, and in which the LOB arises endogenously, as a result of equilibrium between
multiple strategic players (aka agents). This framework is based on a continuum-player game. It closely approx-
imates the mechanics of an auction-style exchange, so that, in particular, it can be used to analyze the liquidity
effects of changes in the rules of the exchange. We use the proposed framework to study the liquidity effects of
high trading frequency. In particular, we demonstrate the dual nature of high trading frequency. On the one hand,
in the absence of a bullish or bearish signal about the asset, the higher trading frequency improves the efficiency
of the market. On the other hand, at a sufficiently high trading frequency, even a very small trading signal may
amplify the adverse selection effect, creating a disproportionally large change in the LOB, which is interpreted as
an endogenous liquidity crisis.
The present article raises many questions for further research. Notice that our main results are of a qualitative
nature: they demonstrate the general behavior of the LOB, as a function of trading frequency, but do not immedi-
ately allow for computations. It would also be interesting to establish quantitative results. In particular, we would
like to construct an equilibrium in a more realistic, and more concrete, model than the one used in Section 3. Such
a model would allow for heterogeneous beliefs, and it would prescribe the specific sources of information (i.e.,
relevant market factors) used by the agents to form their beliefs. A model of this type could be calibrated to market
data and used to study the effects of changes in relevant market parameters on the LOB. Finally, it would be inter-
esting to develop a continuous time version of the proposed framework, in order to better capture the present state
of the markets, where the trading frequency is not restricted. All these questions are the subject of our follow-up
paper Gayduk & Nadtochiy (2016).
9 Appendix A
This section contains several useful technical results on the representation of the value function of an agent in the
proposed game. Notice that (2.1) and (2.2) imply that, if ν is admissible, then, for any (α,m, p, q, r), we have,
P-a.s. ∣∣∣J (p,q,r) (m, s, α, ν)− J (p,q,r) (m, s′, α, ν)∣∣∣ ≤ |s− s′|Eαm|paN | ∨ |pbN |, ∀s, s′ ∈ R
This implies that every J (p,q,r) (m, ·, α, ν) and V νm(·, α) has a continuous modification under P. Thus, whenever
ν is admissible, we define the value function of an agent as the aforementioned continuous modification of the left
hand side of (2.3).
Lemma 9.1. Assume that an optimal control exists for an admissible LOB ν. Assume also that, for any α ∈ A, the
associated value function V νn (·, α), defined in (2.3), is measurable with respect to Fn ⊗ B(R). Then, it satisfies
the following Dynamic Programming Principle.
• For n = N and all (s, α) ∈ S, we have, P-a.s.
(9.1) V νN (s, α) = s
+pbN − s−paN
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• For all n = N − 1, . . . , 0 and all (s, α) ∈ S, we have
V νn (s, α) = esssupp,q,r
{
1{rn=0}E
α
n
(
V νn+1 (s, α) +
(
qnpn + V
ν
n+1 (s− qn, α)− V νn+1 (s, α)
) ·
(9.2) ·
(
1{qn≥0, D+n+1(pn)>ν+n ((−∞,pn))} + 1{qn<0, D−n+1(pn)>ν−n ((pn,∞))}
))
+1{rn=1}
(
q+n p
b
n − q−n pan + EαnV νn+1 (s− qn, α)
)}
,
where the essential supremum is taken under P, over all admissible controls (p, q, r).
Proof: The most important step is to show that, for all n = 0, . . . N − 1 and (s, α) ∈ S,
(9.3) V νn (s, α) = esssupp,q,rE
α
n
(
V νn+1
(
S
n,s,(p,q,r)
n+1 , α
)
− gνn (pn, qn, rn, Dn+1)
)
,
where the essential supremum is taken under P, over all admissible controls (p, q, r), and
gνn (pn, qn, rn, Dn+1) =
(
pn1{rn=0} + p
a
n1{rn=1,qn<0} + p
b
n1{rn=1,qn>0}
)
∆S
n,s,(p,q,r)
n+1
does not depend on s. Assume that J (p,q,r) (n, ·, α, ν) is a continuous modification of the objective function.
Notice that, for all m ≤ k ≤ n, we have, P-a.s.
EαkJ (p,q,r)
(
n, Sm,s,(p,q,r)n , α, ν
)
= J (p,q,r)
(
k, S
m,s,(p,q,r)
k , α, ν
)
+ Eαk
n−1∑
j=k
gνj (pj , qj , rj , Dj+1)
Notice also that, for any (p, q, r) we have, P-a.s.: J (p,q,r) (m, s, α, ν) ≤ V νm(s, α), for all s ∈ S. Let us show that
the left hand side of (9.3) is less than its right hand side
V νm(s, α) = essupp,q,rJ
(p,q,r)
(
m,Sm,s,(p,q,r)m , α, ν
)
= essupp,q,rE
α
m
(
J (p,q,r)
(
m+ 1, S
m,s,(p,q,r)
m+1 , α, ν
)
− gνm (pm, qm, rm, Dm+1)
)
≤ essupp,q,rEαm
(
V νm+1
(
S
m,s,(p,q,r)
m+1 , α
)
− gνm (pm, qm, rm, Dm+1)
)
Next, we show that the right hand side of (9.3) is less than its left hand side. For any (p, q, r), we have, P-a.s.
Eαm
(
V νm+1
(
S
m,s,(p,q,r)
m+1 , α
)
− gνm (pm, qm, rm, Dm+1)
)
= Eαm
(
J (pˆ,qˆ,rˆ)
(
m+ 1, S
m,s,(p,q,r)
m+1 , α, ν
)
− gνm (pm, qm, rm, Dm+1)
)
= J (p˜,q˜,r˜) (m, s, α, ν) ≤ V νm(s, α),
where (p˜n, q˜n, r˜n) coincide with (pˆn, qˆn, rˆn), for n ≥ m + 1, while they are equal to (pm, qm, rm), for n = m.
The proof is completed easily by plugging the dynamics of the state process, (2.1), into (9.3).
The following corollary provides a more explicit recursive formula for the value function and optimal control.
In particular, it states that the value function of an agent at any time remains linear in s, in both positive and
negative half lines (with possibly different slopes).
Corollary 9.1. Assume that an admissible LOB ν has an optimal control (pˆ, qˆ, rˆ). Then, for any (s, α) ∈ S, the
following holds P-a.s., for all n = 0, . . . , N − 1
1. V νn (s, α) = s
+λan(α) − s−λbn(α), with some adapted processes λa(α) and λb(α), such that λaN (α) = pbN
and λbN (α) = p
a
N ;
2. pan ≥ Eαn
(
λan+1(α)
)
and pbn ≤ Eαn
(
λbn+1(α)
)
;
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3. if, for some p ∈ R, Pαn
(
D+n+1(p) > ν
+
n ((−∞, p))
)
> 0, then
p ≤ Eαn
(
λbn+1(α) |D+n+1(p) > ν+n ((−∞, p))
)
;
4. if, for some p ∈ R, Pαn
(
D−n+1(p) > ν
−
n ((p,∞))
)
> 0, then
p ≥ Eαn
(
λan+1(α) |D−n+1(p) > ν−n ((p,∞))
)
;
5. for all s > 0,
• λan(α) = max
{
pbn,Eαnλan+1(α) +
(
supp∈R Eαn
((
p− λan+1(α)
)
1{D+n+1(p)>ν+n ((−∞,p))}
))+}
,
• if qˆn(s, α) 6= 0 and rˆn(s, α) = 0, then
λan(α) = Eαnλan+1(α) + sup
p∈R
Eαn
((
p− λan+1(α)
)
1{D+n+1(p)>ν+n ((−∞,p))}
)
,
and p = pˆn(s, α) attains the above supremum,
• if qˆn(s, α) = 0 and rˆn(s, α) = 0, then λan(α) = Eαnλan+1(α),
• if rˆn(s, α) = 1, then λan(α) = pbn;
6. for all s < 0,
• λbn(α) = min
{
pan,Eαnλbn+1(α)−
(
supp∈R Eαn
((
λbn+1(α)− p
)
1{D−n (p)>ν−n−1((p,∞))}
))+}
,
• if qˆn(s, α) 6= 0 and rˆn(s, α) = 0, then
λbn(α) = Eαnλbn+1(α)− sup
p∈R
Eαn
((
λbn+1(α)− p
)
1{D−n (p)>ν−n−1((p,∞))}
)
,
and p = pˆn(s, α) attains the above supremum,
• if qˆn(s, α) = 0 and rˆn(s, α) = 0, then λbn(α) = Eαnλbn+1(α),
• if rˆn(s, α) = 1, then λbn(α) = pan.
Proof:
Let us plug the piecewise-linear form of the value function into (9.2)
V νn (s, α) = esssupp,q,r
{
1{rn=0}
(
s+Eαnλan+1(α)− s−Eαnλbn+1(α)
+Eαn
((
qnpn + (s− qn)+λan+1(α)− (s− qn)−λbn+1(α)− s+λan+1(α) + s−λbn+1(α)
) ·(
1{qn≥0, D+n+1(pn)>ν+n ((−∞,pn))} + 1{qn<0, D−n+1(pn)>ν−n ((pn,∞))}
)))
+1{r=1}
(
q+n p
b
n − q−n pan + (s− qn)+Eαnλan+1(α)− (s− qn)−Eαnλbn+1(α)
)}
First, notice that it suffices to consider the essential supremum over all random variables (pn, qn, rn).12 Moreover,
the essential supremum can be replaced by the supremum over all deterministic (pn, qn, rn) ∈ R2×{0, 1}. To see
the latter, it suffices to assume that the supremum is not attained by the optimal strategy (with positive probability),
and construct a superior strategy via the standard measurable selection argument (cf. Corollary 18.27 and Theorem
18.26 in Aliprantis & Border (2006)), which results in a contradiction. It is easy to see that, for any fixed (pn, s, rn),
the above function is piece-wise linear in qn, with the slope changing at qn = 0 and qn = s. Hence, for a finite
12The admissibility constraint does not cause any difficulties here, as, in the case where (pn, qn, rn) do not attain the supremum, they can
be improved, so that (pn, qn) increase by no more than a fixed constant.
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maximum to exists, the slope of this function must be nonnegative, at qn → −∞, and non-positive, at qn → ∞.
This must hold for any (pn, rn, s), to ensure that the value function of an agent is finite: otherwise, an agent can
scale up her position to increase the value function arbitrarily. Considering rn = 1, we obtain condition 2 of
the corollary. The case rn = 0 yields conditions 3 and 4. Notice also that the maximum of the aforementioned
function is always attained at qn = 0 or qn = s. Considering all possible cases: rn = 0, 1, qn = 0, s, s = 0, s > 0
and s < 0 – we obtain the recursive formulas for λan and λ
b
n (i.e., conditions 5 and 6 of the corollary). In addition,
as the optimal qn takes values 0 and s, it is easy to see that the piece-wise linear structure of the value function in
s is propagated backwards, and, hence, condition 1 of the corollary holds.
It is also useful to have a converse statement.
Corollary 9.2. Consider an admissible LOB ν and admissible control (pˆ, qˆ, rˆ), such that qˆn(s, α) ∈ {0, s}.
Assume that, for any α ∈ A and any n = 0, . . . , N , there exists a progressively measurable random function
V ν· (·, α), such that, for any s ∈ R, P-a.s., (pˆ, qˆ, rˆ, V ν) satisfy the conditions 1–6 of Corollary 9.1. Then, (pˆ, qˆ, rˆ)
is an optimal control for the LOB ν.
Proof: It suffices to revert the arguments in the proof of Corollary 9.1, and recall that qˆ can always be chosen to be
equal to 0 or s, without compromising the optimality.
10 Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 5.1. The following lemma shows that the normalized price increments are close to Gaussian in
the conditional L2 norm.
Lemma 10.1. Let Assumptions 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 hold. Then, there exists a deterministic function (·) ≥ 0, such
that (∆t)→ 0, as ∆t→ 0, and, P-a.s., for all α ∈ A and all n = 1, . . . , N , we have
Eαn−1
((
ξn/
√
∆t− σtn−1(Wαtn −Wαtn−1)/
√
∆t
)2)
≤ (∆t).
Proof: Notice: ξn/
√
∆t − σtn−1(Wαtn −Wαtn−1)/
√
∆t = 1√
∆t
tn∫
tn−1
µαs ds +
1√
∆t
tn∫
tn−1
(σs − σtn−1)dWαs . Then,
using Assumptions 4.2, 4.4, and Itoˆ’s isometry, we obtain the statement of the lemma.
The next lemma connects the proximity in terms of L2 norm and the proximity of expectations of certain
functions of random variables. This result would follow trivially from the classical theory, but, in the present case,
we require additional uniformity – hence, a separate lemma is needed (whose proof is, nevertheless, quite simple).
Lemma 10.2. For any constant C > 1, there exists a deterministic function γ(·) ≥ 0, s.t. γ(ε) → 0, as ε → 0,
and, for any ε > 0, σ ∈ [1/C,C], and any random variables η ∼ N (0, σ2) and ξ (the latter is not necessarily
Gaussian), satisfying E(ξ − η)2 ≤ ε, the following holds for all p ∈ R
(i) (|p| ∨ 1) |P(ξ > p)− P(η > p)| ≤ γ(ε),
(ii)
∣∣E(ξ1{ξ>p})− E(η1{η>p})∣∣ ≤ γ(ε).
Proof: (ii) Note that∣∣E(ξ1{ξ>p})− E(η1{η>p})∣∣ ≤ ∣∣E ((ξ − η)1{ξ>p})∣∣+ ∣∣E (η(1{ξ>p} − 1{η>p}))∣∣
≤ √ε+ ‖η‖2
√
P(ξ > p, η ≤ p) + P(ξ ≤ p, η > p),
and
P(ξ > p, η ≤ p) ≤ P(p ≥ η ≥ p− 3√ε) + P(|ξ − η| > 3√ε) ≤M 3√ε+ E(ξ − η)
2
( 3
√
ε)2
≤ (M + 1) 3√ε,
where we used the fact that η has a density bounded by a fixed constant M . We can similarly show that P[ξ ≤
p, η > p] ≤ (M + 1) 3√ε. The resulting estimates yield the statement of the lemma.
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Taking ε(∆t) = γ((∆t)) and applying the above lemmas, we get the statement of Lemma 5.1, with (Wαtn −
Wαtn−1)/
√
∆t in place of η0. Finally, we note that the laws of the two random variables coincide under Pαn−1, and
the statement depends only on these laws. The last statement of Lemma 5.1 follows from the fact that Lemma 10.2
is stable under analogous substitution.
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Figure 1: On the left: ask price pˆa (in red) and the associated expected execution prices λˆa (in blue); different
curves correspond to different trading frequencies (N = 20, . . . , 500); black dashed line is the expected change in
the fundamental price α(T − t). On the right: ask price pˆa (in red) and the associated expected execution price
λˆa (in blue), bid price pˆb (in orange) and the associated expected execution price λˆb (in green), for N = 100.
Non-degenerate equilibrium exists only on a time interval where λˆa < 0. All prices are measured relative to the
fundamental price and are plotted as functions of time. Positive drift: α = 0.1, σ = 1, T = 1.
Figure 2: The horizontal axis represents trading frequency, measured in the number of steps N . Left: time-zero
bid-ask spread in the zero-drift case (α = 0). Right: the maximum value of drift α for which a non-degenerate
equilibrium exists on the entire time interval. Parameters: σ = 1, T = 1.
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